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RELATIVE CONSENT AND CONTRACT LAW 
Nancy S. Kim* 
What does it mean to consent? Consent is an essential component of contracts, 
yet its part in contract law is obscure. Despite its importance, there is no independ-
ent doctrine of consent; rather, it plays a key, but ill-defined role in assessing doc-
trines such as assent or duress. This Article addresses this significant omission in 
contract law by disassembling the meaning of contractual consent into three con-
ditions: an intentional act or manifestation of consent, voluntariness and 
knowledge. This Article argues that consent can only be understood relative to 
these three conditions. Accordingly, consent is not merely a conclusion but a pro-
cess and a dynamic that depends upon a variety of factors, including the relative 
blameworthiness of the parties, their relationship, third party effects and societal 
impact. This Article, through an examination of classic and modern cases, demon-
strates how the concept of relative consent provides a coherent framework for un-
derstanding contract law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contracts play an essential role in a free society. They are the tools by which 
individuals may transfer their rights, create obligations for themselves, and bind 
others. A contract is a legally enforceable promise, which means that the state, 
through the courts, has the power to require each party’s performance.1 A con-
tract allows the parties to create their own private law, but the state enforces it.2 
In this way, the state plays an essential role in the redistribution of private prop-
erty. But why should the state intervene in purely private matters? 
There are several grounds upon which state interference in contractual mat-
ters is justified.3 One of the most often cited is that a contract promotes the au-
tonomy of individuals by allowing them to decide how to allocate their property 
rights.4 A contract permits an individual to rent out a room in her home or sell 
her car. A contract thus allows her to use her property as she sees fit. Another 
common justification is that state enforcement provides security of transactions 
which is necessary to the stability of a credit-based economy.5 A credit-based 
                                                        
1  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A contract is a promise 
or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of 
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”). 
2  Id. 
3  For a discussion of contract law theories, please see STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 
(2004). 
4  See Owen M. Fiss, The Autonomy of Law, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 517, 518–19 (2001) (“Contract 
law is also indispensable to assure parties who are bargaining with each other that their prom-
ises will be enforced. Neither contracts nor property law, nor any other body of law . . . that 
might be needed for the market to function, are self-enforcing.”). 
5  See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 576 (1933) (stating that 
the law will enforce contracts “in the interest of the general security of business transactions.”). 
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economy allows more utility from property ownership and allows a more sophis-
ticated and expansive marketplace.6 For example, credit permits a farmer to use 
a tractor now and pay for it after the harvest. Without credit, the tractor would sit 
idle, there would be fewer crops, and the farmer would have less money after the 
harvest to buy goods and services from others. Without the backing of the state, 
the future performance of an individual would depend upon his word—or the 
brute strength of the one to whom performance was owed. Without contracts, 
commercial exchanges would be local, limited to barter exchanges, and enforced 
by the threat of vigilante justice. 
Melvin Eisenberg argued that modern contract law has—and should—be-
come more substantive, subjective, individualized, dynamic, and less formalistic, 
objective, binary, and static.7 He explained that the best possible rules of contract 
law should conform to the following, which he referred to as the “basic contracts 
principle”: 
First, if but only if appropriate conditions are satisfied, and subject to appro-
priate constraints, contract law should effectuate the objectives of parties to a 
promissory transaction. 
Second, the rules that determine the conditions to, and the constraints on, the 
legal effectuation of the objectives of parties to promissory transactions, and the 
manner in which those objectives are ascertained, should consist of the rules that 
would be made by a fully informed legislator who seeks to make the best possible 
rules of contract law by taking into account all relevant propositions of morality, 
policy, and experience.8 
Eisenberg described the basic contracts principle as rejecting single-value 
theories of contract, such as autonomy theories. Instead, he argued that contract 
law should recognize the complexity of the human condition and consider “all 
meritorious values . . . even if those values may sometimes conflict.”9 The basic 
contract principle also “deemphasizes the role of contract law in providing effi-
cient incentives to contracting parties. Under the principle, the purpose of con-
tract law should be to effectuate the objectives of parties to promissory transac-
tions, not to lead them into acting efficiently.”10 The basic contracts principle 
rejects the position that contract law is not promise-based, but requires that 
“promises are to be enforced only under appropriate conditions and only subject 
to appropriate constraints.”11 Importantly, the basic contracts principle “rejects 
the position that contract law should always assume that contracting parties are 
                                                        
6  For a general discussion of how contract shapes and is shaped by a credit economy and 
marketplace changes, see NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND 
RAMIFICATIONS 17–34 (2013). 
7  Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 
1745 (2000). 
8  Id. 
9  Id. at 1747. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
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perfectly rational” and instead adopts the view that contract law should be based 
upon “how people act.”12 
This Article affirms and extends Eisenberg’s basic contracts principle. If the 
purpose of contract law is to “effectuate the objectives of the parties to a prom-
issory transaction,” consent is a prerequisite, an assumption so obvious that it 
scarcely needs to be mentioned. The law typically views promises made without 
consent as not being promises at all. A promise made under duress, for example, 
is void or voidable.13 
The morality of contracts depends upon the validity of consent. Yet, while 
all contracts require consent as a prerequisite,14 the meaning of consent is ob-
scure. Often conflated with assent, courts may make a conclusion on the issue of 
contract formation without delineating what consent requires or what it means to 
consent in a given situation.15 As Eisenberg observed, the balancing of interests 
contained in modern contract doctrine takes into account the complexity of hu-
man relationships, the limits of human cognition, and the unpredictability of the 
future.16 Contract law balances these interests through the vehicle of consent. 
Although the formation of a contract requires consent, contract and consent are 
not equivalents. 
Contracts involve two different time periods: contract formation and con-
tract performance. As circumstances evolve, consent that existed at the time of 
formation may no longer exist at the time of performance. If consent provides 
the moral foundation for promises, what is the justification for enforcing a con-
tract where the promisor has subsequently changed her mind?17 The answer lies 
in the role consent plays in contract. Philosophers and academics typically con-
sider issues of consent from the perspective of the consenting party. But consent 
cannot be considered in a vacuum as the law impliedly, even if not explicitly, 
                                                        
12  Id. 
13  See discussion infra Section III.A.2. 
14  AAA Constr. of Missoula, L.L.C v. Choice Land Corp., 264 P.3d 709, 713 (Mont. 2011) 
(“Identifiable parties capable of contracting, consent, a lawful object, and sufficient consider-
ation comprise the essential elements of any contract.”); Marseilles Homeowners Condo. 
Ass’n v. Broadmoor, L.L.C., 111 So.3d 1099, 1111 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (“Consent is an abso-
lute necessity to the formation of a contract. . . . Importantly, consent envisions agreement on 
all elements of a given sale or contract.”); Southeast Grading, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 324 
S.E.2d 776, 779 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (“An offer and an acceptance are essential prerequisites 
to the creation of every kind of contract. Thus, the law requires that the parties consent to the 
formation of a contract. . . .”) (citation omitted). 
15  See AAA Constr. of Missoula, 264 P.3d at 713; Marseilles Homeowners Condo. Ass’n, 111 
So.3d at 1111; Southeast Grading, 324 S.E.2d at 779. 
16  See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1762 (stating that “[p]romissory transactions seldom occur 
in an instant of time. They have a past, a present, and a future” and the demarcation between 
and among them may not be clear); id. at 1765. 
17  For further discussion on this issue, see Robin Kar, The Art of Promise and Power of Con-
tract, JOTWELL (June 13, 2016) http://juris.jotwell.com/the-art-of-promise-and-power-of-con-
tract/ [https://perma.cc/28W9-DS7B] (reviewing Dori Kimel, Personal Autonomy and Change 
of Mind in Promise and in Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 96 
(Klass, Letsas & Saprai eds., 2015)). 
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recognizes. In contract law, a contract requires mutual consent. Consequently, 
the subsequent change in desire of one of the parties does not release it from its 
obligation unless the other party also changes its mind. The act of consent both 
protects and promulgates the autonomy of both parties. Thus, a contract is no 
longer enforceable if both parties change their minds. But when may a contract 
be avoided where only one party changes its mind? This Article argues that it 
depends upon whether the party seeking contract avoidance validly consented to 
it. 
This Article posits that three conditions are necessary in order for consent to 
exist: an intentional act or manifestation indicating consent, knowledge, and vol-
untariness. The difficulty is in determining how much of each condition is re-
quired in order to reach the conclusion that there was “valid” consent. This Arti-
cle argues that consent validity is a conclusion reached by courts after assessing 
the conditions of consent (intentional act, knowledge, and voluntariness). This 
novel approach thus differentiates “valid” consent from both subjective consent 
and objective consent. Under this Article’s proposed approach, the validity of 
consent (i.e. whether the consent conditions are sufficient) is relative to the situ-
ation, a “sliding scale” which depends upon the relative blameworthiness of the 
parties, and considers their relationship, third party effects, and societal impact. 
Under this view, consent is a process and a dynamic, not simply the state of mind 
of one of the parties. 
Part I introduces and explains the concepts of consent construction and con-
sent destruction. Part II explains how contract formation doctrines reflect the 
concept of consent construction. Part III explains how contract defenses reflect 
the concept of either consent construction or consent destruction. This Article 
concludes that an understanding of contract law requires a more complete and 
nuanced understanding of consent. 
I.  CONSENT CONSTRUCTION AND CONSENT DESTRUCTION 
For consent to be valid, certain conditions are required. It may seem nonsen-
sical or redundant to refer to consent in terms of validity because “invalid con-
sent” is simply non-consent.18 Invalid consent is an oxymoron, but it permits a 
way to discuss and distinguish the manifestation of consent from the conditions 
                                                        
18  But as Brian Bix notes, the 
[G]ap between the assertion that there had (not) been consent and the conclusion that the agree-
ment should (not) be binding is often hidden by use of terms like “full consent” or “valid consent,” 
which indicate, at the least, that there are different types or different extents of consent or, alter-
natively, that consent needs to be combined with other factors for it to transform the moral or legal 
effects of some action. 
 See Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 251, 253 
(Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). Margaret Jane Radin has stated that one 
way to consider consent is to consider what consent is not and considers “varieties of non-
consent” and “problematic consent” to explain the meaning of consent. MARGARET JANE 
RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 20–32 
(2013). 
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surrounding it. It recognizes the complexity of consent: consent is not a line to 
be crossed but a dynamic state that varies depending upon circumstances. To say 
“yes” means to agree, but the way that “yes” is said and the acts to which it grants 
permission may be subject to dispute. A reluctant acquiescence, even if not phys-
ically forced, may not merit the same moral or legal deference as an enthusiastic 
engagement.19 Consent may be incremental, especially in situations where the 
consented-to activity is not discrete or where the boundaries are ill-defined. Con-
sent is also variable, meaning that it may change depending upon new infor-
mation or changes in circumstance.20 For example, a party may consent to work 
at a company because she believes her supervisor will be reasonable. Consent 
may be valid only to a certain extent, beyond which it becomes invalid. The em-
ployee may consent to work with a supervisor who she hopes is reasonable but 
in fact is abusive and has a bad temper. The employee had consented to working 
with a supervisor, but not one who has a bad temper and makes degrading and 
abusive remarks. An individual consents under certain conditions—and may as-
sume certain other conditions or circumstances. These assumptions might later 
prove to be false, which may undermine or negate consent. 
Assessing the validity of consent requires recognizing two distinct types of 
analysis. The first involves whether the party consented. I will refer to this as 
analyzing consent construction. The second involves whether the party continues 
to consent at the time of performance. I refer to this as analyzing consent de-
struction. 
A. Consent Construction 
As previously noted, there are three conditions required for consent to be 
valid: an intentional act, knowledge, and voluntariness. These three conditions 
generally capture the requirements of consent put forth by other scholars. For 
example, John Kleinig states that where A consented to B to do something “[c]on-
sent is centrally and most appropriately a communicative act that serves to alter 
the moral relations in which A and B stand—and that for the moral relations to 
have been altered for B, a communicative act must have occurred.”21 In his view, 
consent must take the form of a communicative act in order to transform the 
                                                        
19  See Orit Gan, The Many Faces of Contractual Consent, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 615, 616 (2017) 
(stating that “consent is not simply a ‘yes-or-no’ question; consent is more complex than such 
an analysis suggests and can be both gradual and continuous.”). 
20 Id. (“Consent is shaped by the relationship between the consenter and the consentee. Factors 
of power, intimacy, trust, arm’s length relations, and more all differently influence consent.”); 
see also Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171, 
199–200 (2013) (Given the realities of power imbalances in personal relationships, “feminist 
insights should be applied to duress doctrine.”). 
21  John Kleinig, The Nature of Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 18, at 3. 
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moral relations between A and B.22 In order for the communicative act to consti-
tute consent for which A should be held responsible, Kleinig states that the con-
ditions of competence, voluntariness, knowledge, and intention must be met.23 
Tom Beauchamp, focusing on informed consent, argues that autonomous choice 
and voluntariness are the central features of consent.24 His theory of autonomy 
features conditions of intentionality, understanding, and voluntariness.25 
1. Intentional Manifestation of Consent 
At the most basic level, all contracts require a manifestation, some act or 
statement that indicates consent to the contract. The manifested act can be a state-
ment, a signature, a click on an “Accept” icon, or a nod of the head. The act 
(whether word or deed) is the “manifestation of consent.” Where the manifesta-
tion of consent is a promissory statement, it may raise problems relating to the 
interpretation of words. Where the manifestation of consent is an action, such as 
a signature on a written agreement, or a click on an “Agree” icon, it may raise 
questions relating to the identity of the actor, or whether the actor understood the 
meaning of the act. The presumption of consent that arises from an action, such 
as signing a document or clicking on an “Accept” icon, is entwined with the 
“duty to read.”26 Rather than being an affirmative obligation, the duty to read is 
a presumption that someone who has signed a document (or clicked to accept 
digital terms) has read the terms that the document contains. 
An intentional manifestation of consent is only one of the requisite consent 
conditions. If the consent conditions of voluntariness and knowledge are defi-
cient, there is no consent despite the manifested act (put another way, the act 
only seemed to, but did not actually, manifest consent). Therefore, as this Article 
will argue, where the manifested act itself was involuntary or conducted in igno-
rance, there is no contract—the agreement is void. Where the manifested act was 
intentional but undertaken without full knowledge, with a heavy heart, or under 
pressure, the contract may be voidable. 
                                                        
22  Id. at 5–12. 
23  Id. at 3–22. 
24  Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 18, at 55. 
25  Id. 
26  Mladineo v. Schmidt, 52 So. 3d 1154, 1158 (Miss. 2010) (“[M]ississippi law imposes on 
insureds a duty to read their insurance contracts and imputes to them knowledge of the contents 
of such contracts.”); Van Den Berg v. Northside Realty Assocs. 323 S.E. 2d 839, 840 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1984) (“The rule in this state is that where one who can read signs a contract without 
reading it, he is bound by the terms thereof, unless he can show that an emergency existed at 
the time of signing. . . .”) (citation omitted); Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W. 3d 227, 229 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2009) (noting that online agreements and the law governing them may be “ ‘an emerg-
ing area of the law,’ but courts still ‘apply traditional principles of contract law and focus on 
whether the plaintiff had reasonable notice of and manifested assent to the online agree-
ment’. . . . Assent is manifested expressly on click-wrap sites, usually by clicking a box or 
button.”) (citation omitted). 
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2. The Knowledge Condition 
Perhaps the most difficult condition to assess is the knowledge condition. 
Research has revealed that human beings suffer from cognitive limitations, such 
as biases, difficulty in assessing very complex information, and time constraints 
that may cause them to make decisions that they may later regret.27 
In a 1974 article Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman examined three heu-
ristics (principles or rules) that people use to assess probabilities and predict val-
ues.28 They argued that people use these heuristics—representativeness, availa-
bility, and adjustment/anchoring—when thinking under uncertainty, which leads 
to biases and “severe and systematic errors” in decision-making.29 
The article and subsequent research by Tversky and Kahneman unleashed 
an entire discipline—behavioral economics—which challenged the classical 
economics concept of the rational man.30 Researchers revealed other cognitive 
biases which negatively affect an individual’s ability to make optimal decisions, 
especially where there is a “temporal disconnect” or lapse of time between the 
intentional manifestation of consent and performance of the consented-to act. 
Assessment of the knowledge condition requires evaluating capacity and in-
formation in light of the motive of the consenting party and the actions of the 
other party.31 The other party might provide misinformation or may conceal in-
formation. In some cases, the other party may have an affirmative obligation to 
provide the consenting party with information. The extent of the other party’s 
responsibility for the information depends upon the type of activity to which the 
party is consenting and the relationship between the parties. 
3. Voluntariness 
The condition of voluntariness is difficult to define and requires a contextual 
analysis. Undoubtedly, an individual who is physically forced to manifest con-
sent is not consenting voluntarily, nor is a person who has no control over an 
automated bodily response, such as a sneeze or other reflexive action. An indi-
vidual who is threatened with physical violence is also not consenting voluntar-
ily.32 But in addition to physical force, bodily reflexes, and threats of physical 
force, there is a range of circumstances that diminish or degrade the condition of 
                                                        
27  See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
28  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCI. 1124, 1124–1131 (1974). 
29  Id. at 1124. 
30  See generally ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004); 
KAHNEMAN, supra note 27, at 4–5 (discussing basic concepts and studies in the area of behav-
ioral economics); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE 
OUR DECISIONS (2008); Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the 
Field, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 315, 341–345 (2009) (discussing research finding overconfi-
dence bias and implications for policy). 
31  See discussion infra Section I.A.4. 
32  See discussion infra Section III.A.2. 
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voluntariness. This approach largely adopts Joel Feinberg’s proposal to treat vol-
untariness as a “variable concept” that depends upon “the nature of the circum-
stances, the interests at stake, and the moral or legal purpose to be served.”33 
Motive is relevant to assessing the condition of voluntariness. Many factors 
might influence a person into acting against that person’s true desires. A lack of 
voluntariness means that those factors have essentially forced a person to act 
against his or her will and that the reason for consenting is not to participate in 
the act but to avoid some other consequence. Generally, however, the condition 
of voluntariness is only deemed to be lacking if the pressure to consent came 
from the party seeking or benefitting from the consent. 
4. Assessing the Consent Conditions 
Consent must be manifested either through words or actions, meaning that 
the consenting party must express it in some way to the other party. The mani-
festation of consent is typically the promissory statement if the contract is oral, 
a handwritten signature on a written contract, and a click if the terms are digital. 
The manifestation of consent must be intentional, meaning the reason or purpose 
for the manifestation of consent is to communicate consent to the act. Randy 
Barnett has argued for a consent theory of contract, which adopts the view that 
manifested assent is actual assent.34 He argues that “courts should presumptively 
enforce private commitments where there exists a manifested intention to create 
a legal relation.”35 But a manifestation of consent is only one of the necessary 
conditions for consent, and does not have enough moral force to justify enforce-
ment without the other two conditions. 
Consent also requires that the consenting party have knowledge of what the 
act of consent entails. Knowledge requires both understanding and information 
in light of the consenting party’s motive for consenting. Voluntariness has two 
aspects. The first is that of volition or control. The manifestation of consent must 
have been intentional rather than reflexive, for example. The second is that of 
desire, and is defined in relation to absence of undue pressure or coercion. Coer-
cion is defined by context, and an evaluation of possible coercion will consider 
the degree and likelihood of harm. A threat to cause physical harm is coercive, 
provided that it is credible. Aside from credible threats of violence, there is less 
certainty about what constitutes coercion. 
The legal definition of consent, particularly when it comes to contracts, does 
not correspond to the normative description of consent. An act of consent will 
rarely be free from any external influence and a decision maker will almost never 
                                                        
33  JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 117 (1986). 
Consequently, risky conduct requires a greater degree of voluntariness, and the more irrevo-
cable the risked harm, the greater the degree of voluntariness required. Id. at 118–20. 
34  Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
647, 662 (2012) (stating that “consent” is a “manifestation of intention to be legally 
bound. . . .”). 
35  Id. at 655. 
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have perfect information. Knowledge is an essential component of consent as a 
normative matter; however, contract law does not require actual knowledge in 
most cases.36 Assessing what the consenting party understands requires inquiring 
into that party’s subjective state, which courts are ill equipped or reluctant to do 
in many cases. Instead, contract law substitutes capacity and access to infor-
mation or notice for knowledge. 
Some categories of people are deemed to lack the capacity to consent.37 The 
requirement of capacity serves two purposes. The first is to simplify determina-
tion of the “understanding” or competency component of consent: for example, 
minors are categorically presumed to be too immature to understand the conse-
quences of their consent.38 In some respects, this capacity determination is over-
broad because some minors may be able to understand the consequences of their 
consent, yet they will be deemed to lack legal capacity. The second purpose of 
capacity is to safeguard against coercion and to simplify determinations of vol-
untariness. Children and other members of protected classes are deemed to be 
particularly vulnerable to pressure and less able to guard against it. 
The difficulties with consent, and the need to identify and distinguish valid 
consent from invalid consent, relate to the difficulties in determining whether the 
necessary conditions have been met in any given situation. While there is general 
agreement that consent requires sufficient information to make an informed de-
cision,39 what extent and quantity of information is sufficient? Similarly, at what 
point does voluntary consent become involuntary? What type of external circum-
stances warrant a conclusion that the consenting party has been deprived of free 
will? 
The determination of legal consent depends, at least to a certain extent, on 
the behavior of the party seeking consent (the “consent-seeker”). This factor is 
not a separate condition but helps in the assessment of each of the conditions. 
                                                        
36  Lietz v. Hansen Law Offices, 271 P.3d 899, 907 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (stating that Wash-
ington follows the objective manifestation test for contract formation and a court “cannot im-
port one party’s unexpressed, subjective intentions into the writing.”); Behrens v. S.P. Constr. 
Co., 904 A.2d 676, 681 (N.H. 2006) (noting that courts must determine parties’ intention under 
an objective standard); Frederick Classical Charter Sch., Inc. v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Educ., 
164 A.3d 285, 335 (Md. 2017) (noting that Maryland courts employ an objective approach to 
contract interpretation, which, unless a contract is ambiguous, gives effect to the language as 
written “without concern for the subjective intent of the parties at the time of formation.”); 
P&N Invs., L.L.C. v. Frontier Mall Assocs., L.P., 395 P.3d 1101, 1107 (Wyo. 2017) (noting 
that “[a] party’s subjective intent is not relevant in contract interpretation cases because we 
use an objective approach to interpret contracts.”). 
37  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12–16 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
38  See discussion infra Section II.C. 
39  See Byrne v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 88 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Mo. 1935) (noting that 
“the essential factor of the contractual relationship must obtain, that is, that there be ‘an agree-
ment or meeting of the minds of the parties’ thereto so that a contract obligatory upon the 
insurance company could not exist if the other party thereto . . . did not make, or authorize, 
the application, consent thereto, or have such knowledge of the insurance on his life as to 
evidence consent thereto or ratification thereof.”). 
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The conduct of the consent-seeker affects the robustness of each of the conditions 
in a “sliding scale” fashion. An assessment of the validity of consent must in-
clude considering whether the consent-seeker diluted one of the conditions by 
her conduct. For example, the consent-seeker’s lies would dilute the knowledge 
condition required for consent and a consent-seeker’s threats would dilute the 
voluntariness condition. 
 In a typical commercial transaction, if the consent-seeker is acting in good 
faith, the requirements for finding the consent conditions are minimal.40 If the 
consent-seeker acts in bad faith, however, the existence of the consent conditions 
must be stronger. A party who takes advantage of another’s ignorance may find 
the contract can be avoided in some situations. Behavior that is even more egre-
gious, such as unlawful threats or lies, may invalidate the other party’s consent 
and the contract.41 Under contract law, whether a party has “freely” or “validly” 
consented typically hinges upon whether the other party manipulated, exploited, 
or coerced the ostensibly consenting party. The concept of consent itself is viti-
ated by force or deception.42 A person deprives another of her free will by forcing 
or deceiving her into an act, including a manifestation of “consent.” Conse-
quently, the presumption of consent created by an outward manifestation may be 
overcome by evidence that the consent-seeker’s behavior undermined one of the 
consent conditions. 
A party cannot be found to have consented without engaging in an inten-
tional act that communicates consent. If she does engage in that communicative 
act, however, the consent-seeker is protected against later denial of consent un-
less the consent-seeker acted wrongfully. The consent-seeker cannot ascertain 
with certainty the internal state of the consenting party. This is a fundamental 
and unavoidable weakness of consent. Furthermore, the human mind is error 
prone, and neuroscience and social science research in the past twenty years has 
revealed how much.43 Some people may lie if it suits their best interests to do so, 
such as if a contract no longer proves as profitable as expected, but others lie 
without intending to do so, simply because they are human. Not only is our rec-
ollection of events incomplete and inaccurate, false memories are common, as 
Daniel Levitin explains: 
                                                        
40 In other situations where consent is required, such as medical procedures or sexual consent, 
much stronger consent conditions are required. This Article focuses on transactions where 
both parties have only a commercial or economic interest. 
41  See discussion infra Part III. 
42  See discussion infra Part III. 
43  In his book, The Organized Mind, Daniel Levitin writes, “Perhaps the biggest problem with 
human memory is that we don’t always know when we’re recalling things inaccurately. . . . 
This faulty confidence is widespread, and difficult to extinguish.” DANIEL J. LEVITIN, THE 
ORGANIZED MIND: THINKING STRAIGHT IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION OVERLOAD 50 (2016). 
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[T]he act of recalling a memory thrusts it into a labile state whereby new distor-
tions can be introduced; then, when the memory is put back or re-stored, the in-
correct information is grafted to it as though it were there all along.44 
An assessment of contractual consent thus should not be made without con-
sidering factors in addition to the internal state of the consenting party. The 
standard of reasonableness serves an important purpose in this respect—it ena-
bles the decisionmaker (the judge, the jury, the arbitrator) to make a determina-
tion about the internal state of another individual that would otherwise be sus-
ceptible to distortion. The distortion may be intentional (the individual is lying) 
or unintentional (the individual’s recollection is faulty). 
Consequently, the perception of the consent-seeker is integral to an analysis 
of consent. Objective consent, at least in contract law, is typically viewed as the 
moment when the manifestation of consent occurred.45 The intentional “manifes-
tation of consent” is a communicative act, the meaning of which depends both 
on how the act is communicated and how it is perceived. A party should not be 
permitted to behave in a way that leads another party to predictably suffer loss; 
on the other hand, a party should not unreasonably respond to the words or con-
duct of another and incur a loss. Each party then is responsible for how her act is 
perceived by the other party. Imposing an objective standard upon the manifes-
tation of consent condition protects both parties by requiring them to behave in 
a manner that conforms to business and social norms. The requirement of consent 
protects the consenting party while the standard of reasonableness protects the 
consent-seeker. 
B. Consent Destruction 
Courts generally interpret a manifestation of consent made under the requi-
site consent conditions to mean that the party has consented to the contract.46 
Consent, once constructed, nevertheless may be withdrawn. A party consents as-
suming certain conditions and circumstances. These implied assumptions might 
later prove to be false. Conditions or circumstances may change the consenting 
party’s understanding and invalidate consent. Consent construction does not re-
quire perfect knowledge nor does it require knowledge of unlikely future events, 
but in some cases, newly acquired information may weaken or even eliminate 
the knowledge condition. For example, X agrees to buy Y’s farm, believing that 
Y’s farm is suitable for farming avocado trees. X later finds out that the soil on 
Y’s farm contains strange chemicals that make it impossible to grow avocado 
trees. Although X had consented to purchase Y’s farm, that consent was based 
                                                        
44  Id. at 56. 
45  See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2nd Cir. 2002) (noting that 
manifestation of assent is the “touchstone of contract.”). 
46  Meyer v. Uber Tech., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 80 (2nd Cir. 2017) (finding manifestation of assent 
and contract formation); cf. Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 811 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1998) (noting that there must be a manifestation of assent by the parties otherwise 
“there is no mutual consent to contract and no contract formation.”). 
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upon misinformation.  In other words, the knowledge condition was deficient at 
the time of contract formation but X did not know it. 
Sometimes the new information may have to do with the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction, and not the transaction itself. This type of additional 
information is not a deficiency in the information condition because it does not 
alter the information upon which consent was based. However, it affects the con-
senting party’s motives. For example, X agrees to buy Y’s farm, believing that 
Y’s farm is suitable for farming avocado trees. X finds out that he has an illness 
and is likely to die within the year. X decides that he does not want to spend his 
savings on the farm, but would rather travel the world while he can. X no longer 
wishes to purchase Y’s farm. X’s motive in purchasing Y’s farm was to grow 
avocado trees. The new information—that X will die soon—does not affect 
whether Y’s farm is suitable for farming avocado trees. There was no defect in 
consent construction; however, the subsequently acquired information has de-
stroyed his consent. This does not, however, mean that Y’s performance is auto-
matically excused or that the contract is unenforceable. 
Consent destruction should be distinguished from promise enforcement. In 
the above scenario, X will still have an obligation to purchase Y’s farm. But the 
reason for enforcing the promise is not that X still consents; it is that X at one 
time consented. Some may argue that the reason for enforcing X’s promise to 
purchase the farm is because X agreed to do so; consequently, to bind X at a later 
time when X no longer wishes to purchase the farm honors X’s autonomy. This 
argument expresses a preference for honoring the desires of an earlier stage X 
(X1) over a later stage X (X2). But the conditions necessary for consent no longer 
exist at this later stage. X2 is not voluntarily agreeing to perform. X2 is the only 
X at the time of performance; X1 no longer exists. The argument then must mean 
that to honor the value of autonomy, one should be required to keep one’s prom-
ises regardless of later circumstances. This, however, is not an argument in favor 
of autonomy; rather, it is an argument in favor of certainty. 
Understanding the problems surrounding consent requires recognizing the 
inherent contradiction of a societal interest in individual autonomy. The contra-
diction manifests itself in the conflict between the contracting parties’ rights and 
freedoms. An individual’s freedom to allocate property rights may conflict with 
the freedom of another individual to do the same, as it does when the parties have 
entered into a contract which one of the parties later wishes to avoid. The ques-
tion is how to resolve the conflict when it arises. 
One might argue that the value of autonomy is furthered by making decisions 
more certain. This can only be true provided that the initial decision was made 
under perfect consent conditions. Perfect conditions, however, never exist. Be-
fore making a decision, an individual rarely has all relevant information. Even if 
the consenting party has access to all the information possessed by the consent-
seeker, additional information may be discovered after contract formation. In 
many situations, time alters the reasons for consenting or the perceptions of what 
doing so entails. Consent is specific to a given moment under certain conditions, 
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and so consent is constructed within those limitations. The more time that elapses 
between the manifestation of consent/contract formation and contract perfor-
mance, the greater the likelihood that the consenting party may change her mind. 
The temporal disconnect which is a part of every contract does not mean that 
a consenting party’s change of heart at a later date negates the earlier consent. 
This Article argues that “consent” typically refers to adequate consent construc-
tion or the fact that consent existed at one time and that it either (1) continues to 
exist at the time performance is required, or (2) no longer exists (has been de-
stroyed) but should nevertheless be treated as though it does—put more pre-
cisely, the party does not consent at the time of performance but other reasons 
(primarily, the consent-seeker’s interests) combined with the past self’s consent 
outweigh the present self’s lack of consent. 
II. CONSENT CONSTRUCTION AND CONTRACT FORMATION 
The justification for allowing the courts to adjudicate contractual disputes is 
that the parties have consented.47 Their consent subjects the parties to state inter-
ference into what is a private affair. Consequently, consent is a prerequisite to 
contract formation. This Part examines each of the formation doctrines—offer, 
acceptance, mutual assent, and consideration—through the lens of consent con-
struction. As this Part explains, each formation doctrine seeks to determine 
whether the requisite conditions of consent have been established in a given case. 
A failure of a consent condition means that the contract has not been properly 
formed. 
Before further discussion, a note about terminology. Although courts and 
commentators often use the terms “assent” and “consent” interchangeably, for 
purposes of this Article, I use the term consent to refer to a party’s permission to 
another to engage in an act or activity which would otherwise be impermissible. 
I will use the term assent to refer to the agreement of a party to undertake some 
action. Assent therefore includes the concept of consent (i.e. permission) but also 
involves the promissory element involving future participatory activity or per-
formance. For example, assume X enters into a contract with Y where X agrees 
to pay Y $250 for Y’s used bicycle. X has assented to the contract by agreeing 
to pay Y money in exchange for the bicycle. X has consented to the terms by 
agreeing to give up her right to the $250 in exchange for the bicycle. Without her 
consent, Y has no right to the money. Now assume that X has told Y that Y may 
use X’s car when X is not in town. X has not assented to anything but she has 
consented to the use of her car by Y when X is out of town. When X returns from 
an out of town trip to discover that Y has driven her car, X may not claim that Y 
stole her car. 
Consent grants permission; it means that a party will refrain from enforcing 
certain rights it has against the party to whom it has granted consent. Assent, on 
                                                        
47  See Bix, supra note 18, at 251 (stating that “consent, in terms of voluntary choice, is—or at 
least appears to be or purports to be—at the essence of contract law.”). 
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the other hand, is both a promise to perform and consent. A contract allocates 
rights, which give the promisee the power of enforcement. Consent is a necessary 
part of a contract but it is not sufficient; assent captures the promise in addition 
to the permission, both of which are essential to contract formation.48 
A. Offer, Acceptance and Mutual Assent 
An offer is a definite expression of a present intent to enter into a contract 
that gives the offeree the power of acceptance.49 Section 24 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts defines an offer as a “manifestation of willingness to enter 
into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that . . . 
assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”50 Assent is always contem-
poraneous with the manifestation of consent.51 Performance may occur at a later 
date, but assent exists when consent is manifested.52 If consent is to be the mech-
anism by which free individuals relinquish or transfer their rights, then it must 
be a communicative act that indicates how the party feels at the time the act is 
communicated. The manifestation is merely an outward expression of the con-
senting party’s internal state. 
In addition, the terms of an offer must be reasonably certain.53 The require-
ment of reasonable certainty pertains to the knowledge condition of consent, and 
the knowledge condition requires both information and understanding. An offer 
that lacks reasonable certainty does not provide enough information about what 
is being offered and so neither party would have sufficient information to under-
stand what it is agreeing to undertake. Similarly, an agreement to agree is not 
enforceable because the parties have not yet assented to the agreement. Because 
essential terms are missing, the knowledge condition is inadequate and there is 
no consent and so, no contract.54 
                                                        
48  This article revisits and further clarifies themes in the author’s earlier work regarding intent. 
In particular, Part III modifies and further develops the relationship of intent and consent in 
the context of basic assumption defenses. See Nancy Kim, Mistakes, Changed Circumstances 
and Intent, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 509–13 (2008). 
49  Farnsworth defines an offer as “a manifestation to another of assent to enter into a contract 
if the other manifests assent in return by some action, often a promise but sometimes a perfor-
mance. By making an offer, the offeror thus confers upon the offeree the power to create a 
contract.” E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.3 (4th ed. 2004). 
50  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
51  See Hagans v. Haines, 984 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the meeting of 
the minds is determined by the expressed or manifested intention of the parties). 
52  Id. 
53  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (“Even though a manifestation of intention is 
intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the 
terms of the contract are reasonably certain.”). 
54  See V’Soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495, 500 (2nd Cir. 1968) (noting that “if essential terms 
are omitted from their agreement, or if some of the terms included are too indefinite, no legally 
enforceable contract will result.”). But see Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 636 (2002) (arguing that one may consent to unknown terms in a 
sealed envelope). 
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Acceptance of an offer requires both a “manifestation of assent to the 
terms”55 and adherence to the terms of the offer.56 For the same reason that an 
offer must be definite and express a present intent to enter into a contract, an 
acceptance must be definite and unequivocal.57 Unlike the straightforward exam-
ples used in many first year classes—“John offers to sell his car to Mary”—in 
many real world transactions, it is not clear which party is the “offeror” and 
which party is the “offeree.” Rather than the clean volley of an offer met with 
the return serve of an acceptance, which creates the “magical moment of contract 
formation,” real world commercial transactions are often complex, with terms 
added and subtracted during the negotiating and drafting process.58 In such cases, 
courts tend to focus on whether there was “assent” to the contract.59 
Proper contract formation requires mutual assent, which means that both 
parties agreed to the same exchange.60 They must not have attached materially 
different meanings to their manifestations.61 The requirement of mutual assent 
helps establish the consent condition of knowledge and voluntariness. Parties 
who have materially different understandings of the agreement cannot be viewed 
as having both assented to it. 
1. The Knowledge Condition in Two Classic Cases 
A classic case involving mutual assent is Raffles v. Wichelhaus, where the 
parties entered into an agreement for the sale of cotton due to arrive on a ship 
called Peerless.62 Peerless was apparently a popular name for a ship in the mid 
1800’s.63 The buyer believed the ship was the one due to sail from Bombay in 
October; the seller meant the ship due to sale from Bombay in December.64 When 
                                                        
55  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Acceptance of an offer 
is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or 
required by the offer.”). 
56  Id. § 58 (“An acceptance must comply with the requirements of the offer as to the promise 
to be made or the performance to be rendered.”). 
57  Id. § 60. 
58  The Restatement recognizes this reality in § 22 which states: “A manifestation of mutual 
assent may be made even though neither offer nor acceptance can be identified and even 
though the moment of formation cannot be determined.” Id. § 22. 
59  Id. § 22. 
60  See Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 811 (1998) (The parties’ out-
ward manifestations must show that all the parties all agreed “upon the same thing in the same 
sense.”) (citation omitted). 
61  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20. 
62  Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 906 (1864). 
63  According to one account, there were at least eleven sailing ships called Peerless sailing 
the seas at the time the parties entered into their contract. See A. W. Brian Simpson, Contracts 
for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 295 
(1989). 
64  See Raffles, 2 H. & C. at 906. 
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the ship arrived in December, the seller was ready and willing to deliver the cot-
ton to the buyer but the buyer refused to accept it.65 The seller sued the buyer.66 
The court held for the buyer, finding that there was a latent ambiguity regarding 
the name Peerless.67 Because the parties had two different ships in mind, there 
was no agreement.68 
The buyer expected the cotton to arrive on the October ship, not the one 
arriving two months later. The buyer should not be forced to purchase cotton on 
the later arriving ship if it never agreed to do so. The consequence of the misun-
derstanding was that the seller had a shipload of cotton and no buyer but it was 
nobody’s fault.  The latent ambiguity meant that the buyer never agreed to pur-
chase the seller’s cotton. Furthermore, the seller could still find another buyer for 
the cotton. Potential market fluctuations complicate the analysis: if the market 
price of cotton dropped, the seller would be in the position of having to sell cotton 
at a lower price. But there is no neutral way to choose one interpretation over the 
other since neither the buyer nor the seller was at fault.  They were speaking of 
two different shipments, even if the shipment was of the same good. At mini-
mum, the parties to a contract should be aware of the subject matter of the con-
tract. Although both the buyer and the seller contracted for the purchase and sale 
of cotton, there was no way to determine which shipment of cotton. Therefore, 
there was no way to determine which contract was breached: was it the one for 
the earlier or later shipment of cotton? If the result seems unfair to the seller who 
was left with a shipment of cotton and no buyer, consider the consequences of 
adopting the seller’s interpretation.  If the seller’s interpretation were to prevail,  
the buyer would have had to purchase the cotton on the later arriving ship. The 
buyer likely needed the cotton at an earlier time, and when it didn’t arrive it may 
have obtained the goods from another supplier or its purchaser might have found 
another supplier. On the other hand, the result would have been unfair to the 
seller if the buyer’s interpretation prevailed. The seller did not agree to deliver 
cotton on the ship sailing from Bombay in October and therefore, it should not 
be held liable for failing to do so. Neither the buyer nor the seller could make a 
compelling argument that its interpretation of the contract was the one to which 
the other had assented so there was no contract. 
Consent in the context of contractual assent does not require a high level of 
knowledge. A party to a contract does not need to understand the meaning of 
all—or even many—of its terms.69 Furthermore, contract law does not require 
actual consent, it requires only a manifestation of consent.70 A manifestation of 
                                                        
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  Id. at 907–08. 
68  Id. 
69  Barnett, supra note 54, at 628–29 (people often fail to read most terms in a form contract 
yet they press “I agree” and consent to the terms they may not understand). 
70  Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 467 (2006) (user manifests assent 
to terms of the shrink-wrap by “engaging in a particular course of conduct that the license 
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consent does not mean that a party has actually assented.71 It means only that a 
reasonable person would have understood the manifestation of consent to indi-
cate that the party assented.72 An objective standard is required to reduce in-
stances of deception, faulty memories, and, perhaps most importantly, wasted 
effort on the part of the consent-seeker who believed there was a contract. 
But assent is more complicated than what the doctrinal rules might suggest. 
Some courts are “act-oriented” while others are “intent-oriented.”73 Act-oriented 
courts focus on what the parties did,74 while intent-oriented courts consider why 
they did it.75 An act-oriented approach assumes that a person who signed a writ-
ten agreement has agreed to its terms. This approach looks at the product of the 
manifestation of assent—the signed agreement. This perspective reflects the so-
called “Duty to Read,” which presumes that someone who signs a contract has 
read its contents.76 Intent-oriented courts, on the other hand, are contextualist in 
                                                        
specifies constitutes acceptance.”); Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or 
Online Contract? Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 
8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 13 (2009) (party who clicked “I agree” twice manifests 
assent and cannot later argue he did not read all the terms in the contract); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b. (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Customers do not in fact ordi-
narily understand or even read the standard terms. They trust to the good faith of the party 
using the form and to the tacit representation that like terms are being accepted regularly by 
others similarly situated. But they understand that they are assenting to the terms not read or 
not understood, subject to such limitations as the law may impose.”); Paul J. Morrow, Cyber-
law: The Unconscionability/Unenforceability of Contracts (Shrink-Wrap, Clickwrap, and 
Browse-Wrap) on the Internet: A Multijurisdictional Analysis Showing the Need for Oversight, 
11 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 28 (2011) (“Most ordinary people do not read these exculpatory 
provisions, forum selection clauses, or other provisions in clickwrap/shrink-wrap or browser-
wrap agreements. Even if the provisions are read, most people do not understand the lan-
guage.”). 
71  The Restatement states that a party’s conduct “may manifest assent even though he does 
not in fact assent.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(3). 
72  17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 30 (2017) (“The court’s inquiry in determining whether mutual 
assent exists is whether a reasonable person would, based upon the objective manifestation of 
assent and all the surrounding circumstances, conclude that the parties intended to be bound 
by the contract.”); In re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, 201 Cal. App. 4th 758, 
798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“Contract formation is governed by objective manifestations, not 
the subjective intent of any individual involved. The test is ‘what the outward manifestations 
of consent would lead a reasonable person to believe.’ ”). 
73  Melissa Robertson, Is Assent Still a Prerequisite for Contract Formation in Today’s E-
Conomy?, 78 WASH. L. REV. 265, 270 (2003) (“Whether a court finds that a user manifested 
assent to an online contract may depend largely on whether the court applies a subjective or 
objective theory of assent.”). 
74  Id. at 270–71. 
75  Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2008) 
(“At one end of the spectrum is the subjective approach, requiring a ‘meeting of the minds.’ ” 
And at the other end is the objective approach, which, uses “the outward appearance, or man-
ifestation, of the parties’ intention.”); Robertson, supra note 73, at 270 (“Under the subjective 
theory, a court examines the actual intentions of the parties and requires, as often stated, a 
‘meeting of the minds.’ ”). 
76  Charles L. Knapp, Is There a “Duty to Read”?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 1085–86 (2015) 
(describing the understanding that “A person signing an agreement has a duty to read it and, 
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approach. They consider the parties’ intent at the time the contract was formed, 
and, in doing so, consider circumstances before and after formation. Accord-
ingly, the fact that the contract was signed is less significant than the reason why 
the parties signed it. The intent of the parties in entering into the contract—rather 
than the act of signing the contract—is what matters.77 
Assume that the contract was written in English and the offeree did not know 
how to read English. Assume further that the offeree was told to sign the contract 
along with other documents, and given only a few minutes to do so. Under those 
circumstances, would a reasonable person believe that the offeree’s signature on 
the contract manifested assent? Or would the signature merely serve as protec-
tion for the offeror, not because the offeror believed that the offeree assented but 
because the offeror knew that a court would view the signature on the page as 
assent? The signature on the page, in other words, is the act that signifies assent. 
But where the act is one that a reasonable person should know does not in fact 
signify assent, why should it be allowed to substitute for assent? Although it may 
for those courts which are act-oriented, it does not for those courts which are 
intent-oriented. 
The Restatement’s approach to interpretation reflects an intent-oriented per-
spective. Section 202 states, in part, as follows: 
(1) Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, 
and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight. 
(2) A writing is interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the same 
transaction are interpreted together. 
(3) Unless a different intention is manifested, 
(a) [W]here language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted 
in accordance with that meaning; 
(b) [T]echnical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning 
when used in a transaction within their technical field.78 
Under this approach, courts should not interpret the words and conduct that 
comprise a contract in a vacuum but in “light of all the circumstances” and in 
                                                        
absent a showing of fraud, if the person is capable of reading and understanding the contract 
then he is charged with the knowledge of what the contract says. . . . He cannot avoid the 
consequences of what he signed by simply saying that he did not know what he signed.”); 
Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts: 
In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 227 (2007) (“[T]he ob-
jective theory of contracts . . . provides that a party’s manifestations of assent are taken to 
mean what a reasonable party would think they mean.”). 
77  Aaron D. Goldstein, The Public Meaning Rule: Reconciling Meaning, Intent, and Contract 
Interpretation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 95, 102 (2013) (“[C]ourts look to extrinsic evi-
dence to determine the subjective intent of the parties. . . .”); Kim, supra note 48, at 481–83 
(it is important to examine “both why the party entered into the contract, and the relevant 
circumstances.”); see also Shahar Lifshitz & Elad Finkelstein, A Hermeneutic Perspective on 
the Interpretation of Contracts, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 519, 520 (2017) (there are two dominant 
approaches in interpreting contracts: “[T]he textualist and the contextualist.”). 
78  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
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accordance with the “principal purpose” of the parties.79 The purpose of inter-
pretation is to carry out the intent of the parties; not simply to enforce the con-
tract.80 The words themselves are not conclusive, even if they are unambiguous; 
rather, language is given its common meaning “unless a different intention is 
manifested.” 
The court then may—and should—look at circumstances prior to formation 
that may be relevant to the parties at the time of formation. Words and conduct 
should be considered in the context of prior interactions between the parties ra-
ther than as if they were spoken for the first time between them. An intent-ori-
ented approach recognizes that each party has a certain responsibility to the other 
party to avoid misunderstandings. Restatement Section 201 states: 
(1) Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement 
or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning. 
(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement 
or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one 
of them if at the time the agreement was made 
(a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, 
 and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or 
(b) that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by 
the other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the 
first  party. 
(3) Except as stated in this Section, neither party is bound by the meaning attached 
by the other, even though the result may be a failure of mutual assent.81 
By focusing on what each party knows about what the other party knows, 
the Restatement approach considers the blameworthiness of each party as part of 
the knowledge condition of consent. This rule of interpretation essentially im-
poses a type of “duty” on each party to correct the misunderstanding of the other 
rather than allowing that party to take advantage of it.82 I use the term “duty” 
here as an affirmative obligation that, although not giving rise to an independent 
cause of action, results in an interpretative preference against the party who is 
                                                        
79  Id. § 202 cmt. b–c. 
80  See McDonald’s Corp. v. Sandbothe, 814 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (noting 
that in the absence of an unambiguous lease term indicating the date of commencement, the 
court will be forced to interpret the parties’ intent in light of circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the contract). 
81  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
82  Joshua M. Glasser, New York and Delaware’s Surprising Doctrinal Dissonance Concerning 
the Admissibility of Undocumented Contractual Intent, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 893 (2017) 
(“[There could be no meeting of the minds sufficient to form a valid contract if one party had 
reason to know the other party did not share its understanding of the ambiguous language and 
was unwilling to accept such understanding, but signed the contract nonetheless. . . . the con-
tract should be construed against the party who apprehended the misunderstanding of the other 
party yet failed to stop it because that party was on notice that the contract could be construed 
in such fashion but assumed the risk by failing to act as a reasonable and forthright negotiator. 
As such, it seems only fair to effectuate the meaning of the party who did not understand the 
provision could mean something else.”). 
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blameworthy. If neither party is blameworthy, then there is no interpretive pref-
erence and no way to determine which meaning should prevail. Accordingly, 
there is no contract (as in Raffles v. Wichelhaus).83 
Another casebook favorite, Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods 
Co.,84 illustrates how these principles were reflected in the common law long 
before the adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Charles Embry 
was employed by Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co. under a written contract 
that was due to expire on December 15, 1903.85 His job was to select samples for 
the company’s traveling salesmen.86 Embry testified that several times prior to 
the termination of the contract, he had tried to renew his contract with the com-
pany’s president, Thos. H. McKittrick, for another year on the same terms.87 Each 
time, McKittrick postponed the decision.88 On December 23, Embry told 
McKittrick that his contract had lapsed eight days previously.89 Embry said that 
if he were to find employment with other firms, he needed to do it by January 
1st, so if McKittrick wanted to retain his services, he must renew his contract or 
he would quit immediately.90 Embry reminded McKittrick that he had requested 
a renewal on two other occasions.91 McKittrick then asked Embry how things 
were going in his department, and Embry replied that his department was busy.92 
McKittrick responded, “Go ahead, you’re all right. Get your men out, and don’t 
let that worry you.”93 
McKittrick’s recollection of the meeting was somewhat different. He said 
that he was in the midst of preparing a report for a stockholders’ meeting when 
Embry told him that he would quit if his contract were not immediately re-
newed.94 In response, McKittrick said, 
Mr. Embry, I am just getting ready for the stockholders’ meeting to-morrow. I 
have no time to take it up now. I have told you before I would not take it up until 
I had these matters out of the way. You will have to see me at a later time. I said: 
‘Go back upstairs and get your men out on the road.’ I may have asked him one 
or two other questions relative to the department, I don’t remember. The whole 
conversation did not take more than a minute.95 
                                                        
83  It is assumed that the parties have given words their generally prevailing meaning and that 
they have assumed that the other has done so; section 201 applies only where one or both 
parties have adopted a meaning that differs from its generally prevailing meaning. 
84  Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907). 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. at 777–78. 
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Embry worked until February 15th, when he was notified that his employ-
ment would be discontinued.96 
The court phrased the central issue in the case as follows: “Did what was 
said constitute a contract of re-employment on the previous terms irrespective of 
the intention or purpose of McKittrick?”97 The court held yes, that  
though McKittrick may not have intended to employ Embry by what transpired 
between them according to the latter’s testimony, yet if what McKittrick said 
would have been taken by a reasonable man to be an employment, and Embry so 
understood it, it constituted a valid contract of employment for the ensuing year.98 
In reaching its conclusion, the court referred to the context of the conversa-
tion between the two men.99 In Embry’s version, the conversation took place after 
Embry had demanded a renewal of his contract, after having been put off for a 
while and having only a few days in which to seek employment with other com-
panies.100 In light of these circumstances, McKittrick’s response, “Go ahead, you 
are all right. Get your men out and do not let that worry you,” could only be 
reasonably interpreted as assent to Embry’s demand that he be employed for an-
other year and that Embry “had the right to rely on it as an assent.”101 
It was not unimaginable for McKittridge, a busy company president prepar-
ing for a meeting, to have spoken the words as a way to dismiss a pestering em-
ployee. But it wasn’t right for him to do so given the circumstances. The court 
focused on Embry’s interpretation of McKittridge’s words, not McKittridge’s 
explanation for his words.102 Yet, McKittridge’s words standing alone—“Go 
ahead, you’re all right. Get your men out and do not let that worry you”—are, at 
best, ambiguous as a statement of reemployment. What the court meant was  
McKittridge should have realized how Embry would have interpreted his words. 
But shouldn’t Embry have realized how McKittrick would have interpreted 
his words? The court implicitly addressed this issue and found that Embry was 
not at fault.103 Embry and McKittridge both understood Embry’s intent by his 
words. Even in McKittridge’s version of events, Embry threatened to quit imme-
diately unless renewed.104 McKittridge’s response, in light of Embry’s threat, 
was either assent to that threat (Embry’s view) or an unresponsive, misleading, 
and manipulative delaying tactic (McKittridge’s view). Either way, McKittridge 
is at fault.105 
                                                        
96  Id. at 777. 
97  Id. at 778. 
98  Id. at 779. 
99  Id. at 778. 
100  Id. at 777. 
101  Id. at 779. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. at 778. 
105  Embry testified that when he learned that he would be discharged, he complained to 
McKittrick that it violated their contract. He stated that McKittrick blamed the termination of 
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The usual way to explain the case is to say that Embry made an offer to 
which McKittrick assented by using words that a reasonable person would un-
derstand as acceptance.106 The moment McKittrick says the words that a reason-
able person could interpret as acceptance, a contract is formed. But this explana-
tion discounts the relevance of the circumstances leading to formation and 
ignores what transpired afterward. Imagine that McKittrick contacted Embry 
later that evening and said, “I’ve had some time to think about it now that I’m 
done preparing for the meeting. I don’t think we’ll be renewing your contract.” 
Under this counterfactual, it is doubtful that the court would have interpreted 
McKittrick’s earlier statements as an acceptance that created an enforceable con-
tract.  Rather, his subsequent statements would have clarified the ambiguity of 
what he said earlier and his actions would have been viewed as reasonable and 
undertaken in good faith.  
The contract between McKittrick and Embry can best be described as an 
implied-in-fact contract. McKittrick’s words taken alone may not constitute ei-
ther an acceptance of Embry’s offer to continue working on the same terms or 
an offer to renew Embry’s contract. But the words spoken in response to Embry’s 
threat to quit and the subsequent actions of both parties, make clear that they had 
agreed to renew the contract. 
Mutual assent means that each party has assented to the contract.107 Whether 
McKittrick assented is only part of the equation; Embry’s assent constitutes the 
other part. McKittrick understood what Embry was asking him. The information 
that Embry conveyed—that he would quit if his contract were not renewed—was 
clear. It could be argued that McKittrick was under time constraints, and that 
Embry should not have interrupted him during this busy time. Embry’s actions, 
however, were not improper or coercive. He was under his own time constraints, 
as he had tried to raise the issue on prior occasions and had only a few days to 
find another job. The contract required McKittrick to pay Embry for a year, pre-
sumably under the same terms, so it required no more from him than a financial 
commitment for a reasonable sum and a reasonable time period. 
                                                        
employment upon the board of directors, which would indicate that he had in fact agreed to 
renew Embry’s contract. Id. 
106  See Keith A. Rowley, You Asked for It, You Got It . . . Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes, Prizes, 
and Contract Law, 3 NEV. L.J. 526, 534–35 (2003) (a reasonable man would have believed 
McKittrick renewed Embry’s employment contract, “[T]he court found that ‘no reasonable 
man would construe [McKittrick’s] answer to Embry’s demand that he be employed for an-
other year [ ] otherwise than as an assent to the demand,’ and, therefore, ‘Embry had the right 
to rely on it as an assent.’ ”). 
107  ARTHUR L. CORBIN ET. AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS pt. 1, ch. 4, § 4.13 (2017) (“It takes two 
to make a ‘bargain,’ although there are some ‘unilateral’ contracts that can be made without 
any expression of assent by the promisee. The great majority of contracts are bargaining con-
tracts, the purpose of which is to effect an exchange of promises or of performances. To attain 
this purpose, there must be mutual expressions of assent to the exchange. These expressions 
must be in agreement, but it is not necessary that they shall consist of identical words or iden-
tical acts.”). 
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By contrast, Embry’s consent to the implied contract would have been im-
properly obtained under McKittrick’s version. Embry made clear that he would 
not have voluntarily continued working without a contract.108 McKittrick wanted 
Embry to continue working but didn’t want to accede to his demands. Instead, 
McKittrick used words that he knew were ambiguous or, at best, non-committal, 
to lead Embry to believe that the contract had been renewed so that he would 
continue working during the busy season. McKittrick claimed he did not intend 
to renew the contract, but he did allow Embry to continue working for him know-
ing what Embry expected. Thus, McKittrick was either deceptive and manipula-
tive when he spoke to Embry using non-committal words, or he was lying to the 
court about not intending to renew the contract. 
In the counterfactual presented above where McKittrick contacts Embry 
later that evening to clarify his intent, McKittrick’s subsequent and timely ac-
tions would indicate good-faith behavior. Furthermore, Embry would not yet 
have relied upon McKittrick’s response in any substantially detrimental way. He 
would still have had time to seek other employment. McKittrick’s actions in the 
counterfactual appear less insensitive, and his preoccupation with the impending 
meeting seems more credible and sympathetic and less manipulative. In the ac-
tual case, McKittrick allowed Embry to continue working at the company for 
several months after the original employment contract lapsed.109 Embry did so 
only because he thought he had a yearlong contract.110 If McKittrick never in-
tended to renew Embry’s contract, he obtained Embry’s consent through decep-
tion. If he did intend to renew it, he was lying to the court. Under these situations, 
the court did the only thing that wouldn’t sanction lying or deceptive and manip-
ulative behavior—it enforced the contract.111 
B. Consideration 
Consideration refers to both the exchange act and the subject matter of the 
exchange. It also encompasses something more: the thing being bargained for is 
something that a party wants and it is the reason she is giving up what the other 
party wants.112 A simple example is X promises to pay Y $50 in exchange for a 
chair. X is promising to give up $50 because X wants the chair; Y is promising 
to give up the chair because Y wants the $50. Lon Fuller wrote that legal formal-
ities, such as the requirement of consideration, fulfill several functions.113 The 
first is evidentiary. A writing (whether under seal or not) provides evidence of 
                                                        
108  Embry, 105 S.W. at 778. 
109  Id. at 777–778. 
110  Id. at 779. 
111  Id. at 780. 
112  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71–81 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
113  Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799–801, 820 (1941). 
While Fuller’s discussion of legal formalities focused on the use of a seal as consideration, the 
discussion included and for purposes of this section extends to the requirement of a bargained 
for exchange without regard to the use of a seal. 
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the parties’ agreement. A bargain, too, provides evidence of the parties’ agree-
ment, as it is more believable that a party would have made a promise in ex-
change for something than for nothing.114 They also fulfill a cautionary or deter-
rent function by checking impulsive actions, or, as Fuller stated, ensuring “the 
circumspective frame of mind appropriate in one pledging his future.”115 The 
third function of consideration is that of “channeling,” which refers to marking 
or signaling the enforceable promise so there is a “simple and external test of 
enforceability.”116 Fuller noted that there is an “obvious . . . intimate connection 
between them,” as whatever accomplishes one of the functions will also tend to 
accomplish the other two.117 
These three functions can be viewed as ensuring or establishing different 
conditions of consent. Consent construction requires an intentional manifestation 
of consent.118 Consideration can provide evidence of the promisor’s intentional 
manifestation of consent. The knowledge condition requires both information 
and understanding. One of the many cognitive shortcomings of humans is that 
we often act impulsively and without deliberation.119 The cautionary and chan-
neling functions are intended to restrain the human tendency toward impulsivity 
and myopia, and enhance the condition of knowledge. The concept of a bargain 
captures more than either the exchange or the goods being exchanged. It also 
captures the notion of motive or desire, which means the reason for each party 
offering the thing is because he or she wants what the other party is offering. The 
requirement of desire, inherent in the concept of a bargain, thus captures the con-
sent condition of voluntariness. 
1.  Consideration and the Voluntariness Condition in Two Classic Cases 
Two classic cases illustrate the way the doctrine of consideration works to 
ensure proper consent construction. In Dougherty v. Salt, a woman went to visit 
her orphaned nephew.120 After his guardian told her how well he was doing in 
school, the aunt said that she loved her nephew very much and would take care 
of him.121 The guardian expressed doubt, and to show her sincerity, the aunt 
wrote a note for $3,000, payable at her death or before, which contained the 
                                                        
114  See id. at 800. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. at 801. 
117  Id. at 803. 
118  Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U.L. REV. 529, 535 n.21 (2007) 
(manifestation of consent in online contracts “presumes the consumer is capable of finding the 
contract and is able to review it” but they are “ostensibly saying ‘yes’ to a contract that likely 
cannot be understood by many users and usually goes unread.”). 
119  See Stephen B. Manuck et al., A Neurobiology of Intertemporal Choice, in TIME AND 
DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 139 
(George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003) (noting that human beings often devalue later rewards 
over more immediate ones). 
120  Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94 (N.Y. 1919). 
121  Id. 
18 NEV. L.J. 165, KIM - FINAL 12/15/17  12:41 PM 
190 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:165  
words “value received.”122 The aunt died before she paid the note.123 The court 
found that there was no consideration for the promissory note and so it was an 
unenforceable gratuitous promise.124 In the second classic case, Hamer v. Sid-
way, an uncle promised his nephew $5,000 if the nephew refrained from smok-
ing, drinking and gambling until he was twenty-one years old.125 After the 
nephew performed, the uncle wrote him a letter acknowledging that the uncle 
owed his nephew money, but stating that he wanted to hold the money until his 
nephew was ready to use it.126 The uncle died before paying the money to his 
nephew.127 The uncle’s executor refused to pay, claiming the promise was made 
without consideration.128 The court found that the nephew’s abstinence consti-
tuted a legal detriment which was sufficient consideration.129 
As a matter of consideration doctrine, the cases are straightforward. In 
Dougherty v. Salt, the aunt’s promise to pay the nephew was impulsive and in-
duced by guilt.130 Writing out the note and the words “value received,” failed to 
suffice as consideration primarily because the plaintiff acknowledged to the court 
that no value was in fact received, despite the words to the contrary.131 The aunt 
did not request that her nephew continue to do well in school.132 Her promise to 
pay him money could be seen as a gift because he had already done well in 
school.133 Conversely, in Hamer v. Sidway, the uncle got what he bargained for, 
which was a nephew who did not smoke, drink, or gamble until he was twenty-
one years of age.134 
These two cases show the role of consideration in consent construction. The 
aunt in Dougherty v. Salt acted impulsively, apparently with no intention of giv-
ing her nephew money when she set out to pay him a visit.135 When she expressed 
her love for her nephew and her plans to take care of him, the following conver-
sation ensued: 
Guardian: I know you do, Tillie, but your taking care of the child will be 
 done  probably like your brother and sister done, take it out in  talk. 
                                                        
122  Id. at 94–95. 
123  Id. at 94. 
124  Id. 
125  Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
126  Id. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 257. 
129  Id. 
130  Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94, 94 (N.Y. 1919) (showing a conversation between the aunt 
and the boy’s guardian that portrays a situation where the aunt agreed to make out the note 
because she felt pressure from the guardian to do the right thing). 
131  Id. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. (stating that the boy’s guardian said, “Yes; that he is getting along very nice, and getting 
along nice in school.” The guardian then showed the aunt the boy’s progress reports). 
134  Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 258 (N.Y. 1891). 
135  Dougherty, 125 N.E. at 94. 
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Aunt Tillie: I don’t intend to take it out in talk; I would like to take care 
of  him now. 
Guardian: Well, that is up to you. 
Aunt Tillie: Why can’t I make out a note to him? 
Guardian: You can, if you wish to. 
Aunt Tillie: Would that be right? 
Guardian: I do not know, but I guess it would; I do not know why it would 
 not. 
Aunt Tillie: Well, will you make out a note for me? 
Guardian: Yes, if you wish me to. 
Aunt Tillie: Well, I wish you would.136 
The aunt then filled out the note and handed it to her nephew with the words, 
“You have always done for me, and I have signed this note for you. Now, do not 
lose it. Some day it will be valuable.”137 The aunt was not forced to write the 
promissory note, but she was pressured to do so under circumstances that suggest 
that her actions were not entirely voluntary (e.g. the guardian’s shaming words, 
her well-behaved nephew present and listening to every word). She repeatedly 
asked whether it would be acceptable to write him a note (why wouldn’t it be 
acceptable to give her nephew money?), which suggests reluctance. There is no 
doubt that she made the promise. Yet, the circumstances under which she did 
suggest that consent was not solidly constructed. The pressure that she felt does 
not rise to the level of coercion, but her promise may not have reflected her true 
desire. If the promise to pay her nephew did reflect her true desire, she could 
have left him the money in her will. The nephew sued the aunt’s testatrix,138 
which suggests that she did not mention the note in her will or leave any provi-
sion for her nephew in it. While supporting her nephew may be admirable, the 
aunt has the right to decide what to do with her property. Even if her intent to 
pay the money was genuine at the time she made the note, she might have 
changed her mind after the visit, when she had a chance to reflect upon whether 
it was something she really wanted to do. The owner of property has the right to 
give it away, or she can decide to keep it.139 In order to limit her freedom to do 
that, there must be a countervailing interest. This is what the requirement of con-
sideration does best: it ensures that an individual’s freedom to control her prop-
erty is restricted only for good reason. The requirement of a bargain finds that 
“good reason” in the other party’s self-imposed limitation on the exercise of a 
freedom. In other words, the requirement of consideration protects the autonomy 
interest of both the promisor and the promisee.140 It leaves the promisor free if 
                                                        
136  Id. 
137  Id. at 95. 
138  Id. at 94. 
139  State ex rel. Wis. Edison Corp. v. Robertson, 299 N.W.2d 626, 630 n.11 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1980) (noting that real property ownership gives the owner the right to enter the property, use 
it, sell it, lease it, or give it away). 
140  Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1191, 1299 (1998) (legal rules such as the consideration requirement can protect the prom-
isor and promisee); 14 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1636 
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the promisee is also free; it binds the promisor if the promisee is similarly bound. 
In Dougherty v. Salt, Aunt Tillie’s good nephew was not restricting his freedom 
in any way; therefore, there was no reason to restrict Aunt Tillie. 
Hamer v. Sidway provides a useful contrast to Dougherty. William Story, 
the uncle of William Story, 2d, approached his nephew at a large family celebra-
tion and made a promise to pay the nephew $5,000 if the nephew refrained from 
drinking, smoking and gambling until he was twenty-one years old.141 The un-
cle’s promise was made “in the presence of the family and invited guests.”142 The 
uncle appears to have made the promise on his own initiative and without prod-
ding from anyone.143 After the nephew fully performed, he wrote to notify his 
uncle.144 The uncle responded a few days after receiving the letter: 
Dear Nephew: 
Your letter of the 31st ult. came to hand all right, saying that you had lived 
up to the promise made to me several years ago. I have no doubt but you 
have, for which you shall have five thousand dollars, as I promised you. I 
had the money in the bank the day you was twenty-one years old that I 
intend for you, and you shall have the money certain. Now, Willie, I do 
not intend to interfere with this money in any way till I think you are ca-
pable of taking care of it, and the sooner that time comes the better it will 
please me. I would hate very much to have you start out in some adventure 
that you thought all right and lose this money in one year. The first five 
thousand dollars that I got together cost me a heap of hard work. . . . This 
money you have earned much easier than I did, besides acquiring good 
habits at the same time, and you are quite welcome to the money. Hope 
you will make good use of it. I was ten long years getting this together 
after I was your age. . . . Truly yours, W.E. Story. P.S. You can consider 
this money on interest.145 
The nephew agreed that the money should remain with his uncle, but the 
uncle died several years later without having paid over the money to the 
nephew.146 The executor of the uncle’s estate rejected the nephew’s claim on the 
grounds that the contract was without consideration.147 The executor claimed that 
the nephew, by refraining from smoking and drinking, was benefitted while the 
uncle was not.148 The court rejected that argument, holding that the nephew had 
                                                        
(3d ed. 1972) (In determining what is reasonable, consideration should be given to: (1) 
Whether the promise is broader than that which is necessary to protect some legitimate interest 
of the promisee, (2) the effect of the promise on the promisor, and (3) the effect of the promise 
on the public). 
141  Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. 
147  The claim was actually brought by someone who had acquired it through several mesne 
assignments from the nephew, which is irrelevant for this discussion. 
148  Hamer, 27 N.E. at 257. 
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given up his lawful freedom of action and it did not matter whether the uncle 
benefitted.149 
The conditions of consent in Hamer v. Sidway are clearly established. The 
uncle made the offer to the nephew unprompted. He made it freely and without 
any pressure from anyone. Although the uncle may have been in a celebratory 
mood given the occasion, the offer does not seem to have been made impulsively. 
Significantly, he acknowledged his obligation and stated in a letter that the 
money belonged to his nephew. The acknowledgement by the uncle years later, 
in writing, indicates that the promise was made sincerely, deliberately, and 
thoughtfully. 
But what if the uncle had made the initial offer in an impulsive, celebratory, 
and perhaps even drunken state of mind? If he had promptly retracted his offer, 
there would have been no contract and he would not have been bound. The offer 
created a unilateral contract, meaning that the nephew could only have accepted 
by performance, and traditional contract law permitted an offeror to revoke an 
offer for a unilateral contract before performance had been completed.150 Even 
under Section 45 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, it is doubtful that the 
nephew’s abstinence from drinking and smoking for an evening or even a few 
days would constitute partial performance to create an option contract binding 
the uncle.151 On the other hand, a modern court would probably find a revocation 
just prior to the nephew’s twenty-first birthday to be ineffective. The nephew did 
not abstain from drinking and smoking simply because his uncle requested it; he 
did it in order to receive $5,000. To change the bargain after he has already sub-
stantially performed would change the nature of the act from one of agency to 
one obtained through manipulation.  Thus, the nephew’s performance would 
have been an expression of his uncle’s will, rather than his own. 
C. Capacity to Contract, Knowledge, and Voluntariness 
Certain categories of people are deemed incapable of consent, and, thus, in-
capable of entering into contracts.152 Children (typically those under eighteen) 
and the mentally infirm may escape contracts because courts presume they lack 
the ability to meet the knowledge condition necessary for valid consent.153 Fur-
thermore, their vulnerability makes them more susceptible to exploitation by oth-
ers and so raises concern that an agreement entered into by these vulnerable par-
ties may not be entirely voluntary. 
                                                        
149  Id. 
150  See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 446 (8th ed. 2006). 
151  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Where an offer invites 
an offeree to accept by rendering a performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, 
an option contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or 
tenders a beginning of it.”). 
152  See generally id. §§ 12–16. 
153  Id. § 14. 
18 NEV. L.J. 165, KIM - FINAL 12/15/17  12:41 PM 
194 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:165  
Yet, the law recognizes the complexity of human behavior and that those in 
need of protection may sometimes be the ones who seek unfair advantage. The 
general rule is that contracts are voidable by the protected class member but there 
are several caveats and notable exceptions.154 There are some transactions that 
the minor cannot avoid on public policy grounds, such as child support agree-
ments.155 Furthermore, as with the other formation doctrines, the law in this area 
considers the actions and intention of both parties and considers whether either 
party has gained from the agreement.156 Two consent conditions are particularly 
relevant when assessing lack of capacity defenses: knowledge and voluntari-
ness.157 The actions of the consent-seeker are especially relevant and subject to 
careful scrutiny given the vulnerabilities of protected class members. 
A minor may avoid both an executory contract and an executed transac-
tion.158 The adult party to the transaction may not. The infancy doctrine presumes 
that the minor lacks the knowledge and voluntariness conditions necessary for 
valid consent. An adult who contracts with a minor is essentially presumed to be 
taking advantage of the minor and so should not benefit from engaging in bad 
behavior. But where there was no bad faith behavior on the part of the adult, 
courts will not allow the minor to use the infancy doctrine to take unfair ad-
vantage of the adult.159 Generally, a minor who disaffirms a contract must reject 
all of it and cannot retain any of the benefits.160 A minor who avoids a contract 
may still be held accountable for benefits received.161 If the minor receives food, 
clothing, or other “necessaries,” she will be accountable for their reasonable 
value.162 In some states, the minor may not recover money that the minor has 
already paid for furnished goods or services, although the adult would not be able 
to recover unpaid but owed money from the minor for furnishing those goods 
and services.163 In some states, the adult may obtain restitution where the minor 
made a misrepresentation of age.164 Finally, if the minor ratifies the transaction 
after reaching the age of majority, the transaction is no longer voidable.165 
                                                        
154  Id. § 12. 
155  JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 8.2, at 262 (7th ed. 2014) (noting that “there are certain 
situations where the infant cannot avoid the contract” including “if a minor male contracts to 
support his out-of-wedlock child, this promise cannot be disaffirmed as he is under a legal 
obligation to support his children.”). 
156  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12–16 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
157  Id. 
158  PERILLO, supra note 155, § 8.1, at 261. 
159  Id. 
160  Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Minor Restrictions: Adolescence Across Legal 
Disciplines, the Infancy Doctrine, and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust En-
richment, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 343, 344, 348–49 (2012). 
161  Id. at 348–49. 
162  FARNSWORTH, supra note 49, § 4.5, at 225. 
163  Id. at 224–25. 
164  Id. at 225. 
165  PERILLO, supra note 155, § 8.11, at 279–80. 
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Another category of protected parties consists of the mentally infirm. While 
capacity based on age can be determined with a bright-line rule, capacity based 
upon mental fitness cannot. Mental infirmity is variable and exists on a contin-
uum. It can mean the party lacks the ability to understand to what she is consent-
ing. In some cases, however, an individual may understand what she is doing but 
is unable to adequately control her actions. The other party may know of her 
diminished capacity and take advantage of the situation. While moderately or 
minimally diminished capacity of the consenting party alone may not make the 
contract voidable, the knowledge of the consent-seeking party regarding that di-
minished state makes the situation exploitative and the contract voidable. Re-
statement § 15 reflects this variable approach to consent by finding a lack of 
capacity to contract where the party has either: (1) greatly diminished cognitive 
abilities, or (2) moderately diminished cognitive abilities with advantage-taking 
by the other party: 
(1) A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction 
if  by reason of mental illness or defect 
(a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and 
 consequences of the transaction, or 
(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction 
and  the other party has reason to know of his condition.166 
The Restatement position recognizes that if an individual cannot understand 
the transaction, she cannot consent.167 Even where the party is capable of under-
standing the transaction, if she no longer wishes to continue with the transaction 
and thus, no longer consents, the court will not find worthy of protection the 
interest of the consent-seeker who acted opportunistically.168 
III. CONSENT AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 
Despite a “manifestation of consent,” a party may seek to avoid contractual 
obligations by using one of several contract claims or defenses. The basis for 
avoidance may be either that the party never consented (consent was never con-
structed and so there was no contract formation) or that, due to additional infor-
mation or changed circumstances, the party no longer wishes to perform (consent 
was destroyed). The defenses have different effects and may render a contract 
void, voidable or unenforceable.169 The distinction between “void” and “voida-
ble” has confused many law students, attorneys, judges and more than a few leg-
islators.170 One court noted that there are “innumerable cases in which the word 
                                                        
166  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
167  Id. 
168  Id. § 15 cmt. f. 
169  See discussion infra Part III. 
170  One court noted that “[t]he word ‘void’ is not always used with technical precision.” See 
Yannuzzi v. Commonwealth, 390 A.2d 331, 332 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978). Another court noted 
that “what is only voidable is often called void.” See Larkin v. Saffarans, 15 F. 147, 152 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1883). 
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‘void’ when used in statutes, ordinances, and in a variety of other contexts has 
been interpreted to mean ‘voidable.’ ”171 A void contract is a misnomer and not 
a contract at all (although I will continue to use the term for lack of a suitable 
alternative)—it cannot bind anyone.172 By contrast, a voidable contract may be 
rescinded but it may also be ratified by the protected party.173 A voidable contract 
typically has legal consequences until the power of avoidance is exercised.174 On 
the other hand, if the party ratifies it, the power of avoidance is terminated.175 A 
void contract may not be ratified, and there is no legal remedy for its breach.176 
The consequences of a contract being void or voidable may be significant 
because a void contract cannot be enforced even by an innocent third party, such 
as a good faith purchaser or assignee.177 It also affects the burden of proof, as a 
party seeking to enforce a contract has the burden of establishing the contract’s 
existence, while a party seeking to avoid a contract must bear the burden of prov-
ing grounds for avoidance.178 
The term “unenforceable” only adds to the confusion.179 The term encom-
passes a wide variety of contracts. Void contracts are unenforceable, but they are 
                                                        
171  Yannuzzi, 390 A.2d at 332. 
172  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. a (noting that a void contract is “not a 
contract at all; it is the ‘promise’ or ‘agreement’ that is void of legal effect. If the term ‘con-
tract’ were defined to refer to the acts of the parties without regard to their legal effect, a 
contract could without inconsistency be referred to as ‘void.’ ”); see also Guthman v. Moss, 
150 Cal. App. 3d 501, 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“A void contract is no contract at all; it binds 
no one and is a mere nullity.”). 
173  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (“A voidable contract is one where one or 
more parties have the power, by a manifestation of election to do so, to avoid the legal relations 
created by the contract, or by ratification of the contract to extinguish the power of avoid-
ance.”); see also Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 62 Cal. 4th 919, 930 (Cal. 2016) 
(“Despite its defects, a voidable transaction, unlike a void one, is subject to ratification by the 
parties.”); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Smith, 414 S.E.2d 485, 488 (Ga. 1992) (noting that a voidable 
contract may be ratified). 
174  Yvanova, 62 Cal. 4th at 930. 
175  Fumai v. Levy, No. Civ.A. 95-1674, 1998 WL 42297, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1998). 
176  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7; see also Norfolk S. Corp., 414 S.E. at 
488; Yvanova, 62 Cal. 4th at 930. 
177  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7; see also Norfolk S. Corp., 414 S.E. at 488; 
Yvanova, 62 Cal. 4th at 930. 
178  PERILLO, supra note 155, § 9.22, at 324. 
179  One court noted that there is “more than a little confusion surrounding the terms ‘void 
contract,’ ‘voidable contract,’ and ‘unenforceable contract’ ” and that the “term ‘unenforceable 
contract’ is perhaps the source of the most confusion.” Fumai v. Levy, No. Civ.A. 95-1674, 
1998 WL 42297, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1998); see also Jesse A. Schaefer, Beyond a Defini-
tion: Understanding the Nature of Void and Voidable Contracts, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 193, 
193 (2010) (noting that the meanings of “void,” “voidable” and “unenforceable” are “persis-
tently and maddeningly slippery.”). 
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not actually contracts at all.180 Voidable contracts are those that may not be en-
forced if a party exercises her power of avoidance. The Restatement states that 
voidable contracts “might be defined as one type of unenforceable contract.”181 
Yet there are other contracts for which judicial remedies are unavailable but are 
neither void nor voidable.182 These contracts have some effect upon the parties’ 
legal relationship and may be enforceable by non-judicial methods. These “un-
enforceable” contracts include those subject to the Statute of Frauds or the Stat-
ute of Limitations.183 The Restatement (Second) Contracts defines an “unen-
forceable contract” as “one for the breach of which neither the remedy of 
damages nor the remedy of specific performance is available, but which is rec-
ognized in some other way as creating a duty of performance, though there has 
been no ratification.”184 Unlike voidable contracts, these unenforceable contracts 
create legal consequences through means other than ratification.185 But, as 
Corbin noted, “there are important differences in the legal relations that are cre-
ated by the various agreements that are called unenforceable contracts.”186 
Contracts that are unenforceable, but neither void nor voidable, involve nei-
ther the adequacy of a consent condition nor wrongdoing on the part of the party 
seeking enforcement.187 Rather, this category of contract is unenforceable either 
because of external circumstances or requirements outside the control of either 
party.188 Those circumstances may simply be the passage of time which exceeds 
the Statute of Limitations.189 Another type of external circumstance is a formal 
requirement, such as the requirement of a writing. These unenforceable contracts 
may still have legal consequences.190 If the basis for non-enforceability is not 
based upon inadequate consent construction or wrongdoing, these types of unen-
forceable contracts may be rehabilitated in circumstances where there is no harm 
to the underlying policy.191 For example, a subsequent promise to pay a debt 
barred by the Statute of Limitations is enforceable even without new considera-
tion.192 The policy arguments in favor of timely resolution of disputes, such as 
                                                        
180  See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 7, at 11 (1952) (“In the term ‘void 
contract,’ there is a self-contradiction. This is because the term ‘contract’ is always defined so 
as to include some element of enforceability.”). 
181  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 8 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
182  CORBIN, supra note 180, § 8, at 12–13. 
183  Id. at 13. 
184  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 8. 
185  Id. § 8 cmt. a. 
186  CORBIN, supra note 180, § 8, at 13. 
187  See discussion supra Part III. 
188  See discussion supra Part III. 
189  CORBIN, supra note 180, § 8, at 13. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. 
192  See Dow v. River Farms Co. of Cal., 243 P.2d 95, 99 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (“If there 
was once a past legal obligation, but the remedy is barred, such as where the debt is barred by 
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the deterioration of evidence and the peace of mind of the defendant,193 are irrel-
evant where the promisor has made a subsequent promise, which is evidence of 
his obligation and his lack of peace of mind, despite the passage of time. 
To compound the confusion, variations of the same defense may have dif-
ferent effects. Fraud, for example, can render a contract either void or voidable, 
depending upon the type of fraud.194 Duress, too, can render a contract either void 
or voidable depending upon the type of duress visited upon the victim.195 The 
broad category of illegal contracts may be unenforceable and/or void or voida-
ble.196 
Generally, contract defenses197 can be placed in three categories: No Consent 
defenses, Defective Consent defenses and Extinguished Consent defenses. No 
Consent defenses are used when there is no manifestation of consent and accord-
ingly, no presumption of consent. Consequently, any ostensible contract is 
void.198 These defenses include fraud in the execution and duress by physical 
compulsion. Defective Consent defenses are used when there is an intentional 
manifestation of consent but one of the consent conditions was absent or defi-
cient. This category encompasses the defenses of mistake, fraud in the induce-
ment, duress by improper threat, and unconscionability. Both No Consent and 
Defective Consent scenarios mean that consent was not properly constructed. In 
the Extinguished Consent category are those defenses (improbability and frustra-
tion of purpose) where consent was properly constructed but subsequent events 
resulted in consent destruction. 
The myriad rules governing contract defenses may seem impossible to rec-
oncile, but they can be explained using a relative consent framework. A relative 
consent framework demonstrates that most of the defenses seek to determine 
whether the conditions of consent have been established to such an extent as to 
justify enforcement. 
                                                        
the statute of limitations or a discharge in bankruptcy, a subsequent promise to pay is enforce-
able; or where the original obligation is barred by the statute of frauds the subsequent promise 
to pay is enforceable.”) (internal citation omitted). 
193  See generally Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of 
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 460–99 (1997) (discussing the different policies underlying stat-
utes of limitations). 
194  Giannone v. Ayne Inst., 290 F. Supp. 2d 553, 561 (E.D Pa. 2003) (noting that “fraud in the 
factum” renders a contract void while “fraud in the inducement” renders a contract voidable). 
195  See discussion infra Section III.A.2. 
196  See PERILLO, supra note 155, § 22.1, at 773 (“As a general rule an illegal bargain is unen-
forceable and, often void.”); CORBIN, supra note 180, § 7, at 12 (“Most bargains that are de-
scribed as ‘illegal’ are not wholly void of legal effect; but an agreement by two parties for the 
doing of acts that both know to be a felony would have no legal operation and be ‘void,’ 
although the acts themselves, when performed, would have very important effects indeed.”). 
197  For purposes of this section, I do not include claims that one might raise to bar a contract 
claim which render it contract unenforceable for a non-doctrinal reason, such as the Statute of 
Limitations. 
198  See discussion infra Section III.A. 
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A.  No Consent and Void “Contracts” 
If a contract is a legally enforceable promise,199 then there is no such thing 
as a void “contract.” There are, however, documents signed by parties that may 
look like contracts. Someone (A) may try to enforce this ostensible contract 
against another (B). One type of argument that B can make to avoid the contract’s 
obligations is that the contract was never formed and is void. B might, for exam-
ple, argue that there was no consideration or that the agreement lacked mutuality. 
As previously discussed, contract formation doctrines are intended to establish 
consent construction.200 B could also argue that there was no assent to the terms 
due to misunderstanding,201 fraud or duress. 
1. Fraud 
An agreement is void if it is the result of fraud in the execution (often re-
ferred to as fraud in the inception or fraud in the factum).202 Fraud in the execu-
tion pertains to the inception or making of the agreement so one would be arguing 
that she was deceived as to the nature of the act and did not know what she was 
signing.203 To use the language of consent construction, fraud in the execution 
means that the condition of intentional manifestation of consent is absent because 
the act was not intentional and does not manifest assent to the terms. The 
knowledge condition is also absent. By contrast, fraudulent representations (of-
ten referred to as fraud in the inducement) render a contract voidable.204 The 
avoiding party must prove that the false representation was material and that she 
relied upon it.205 In essence, she must argue that the knowledge condition failed 
and the failure was the result of the other party’s actions. 
A contract may be void even without physical force in fraud in the execution 
cases. For example, in Duick v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.,206 the plaintiff received 
                                                        
199  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A contract is a promise 
or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of 
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”). 
200  See discussion supra Section II.B. 
201  See discussion supra Section II.A. 
202  See Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061, 1073 (Cal. 1996) (defining 
fraud in the execution as where “the promisor is deceived as to the nature of his act, and actu-
ally does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a contract at all, mutual 
assent is lacking, and [the contract] is void.”). 
203  Id. 
204  Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 662 N.W.2d 652, 666 (Wis. 2003) (stating that fraud in 
the inducement “renders the underlying contract voidable”). 
205  Hillcrest Pac. Corp. v. Yamamura, 727 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (“To 
state a cause of action for fraud in the inducement, a plaintiff must allege . . . [a] misrepresen-
tation of a material fact” which the representor knew or should have known was false and 
intended to induce the action). 
206  See generally Duick v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A, Inc., 198 Cal. App. 4th 1316 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011). 
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an email inviting her to participate in a “personality evaluation.”207 In order to 
begin, she clicked on a drawing of a door with the word “Begin” underneath it, 
which led to a web page entitled, “Personality Evaluation Terms and Condi-
tions.”208 She then had to scroll through the terms and conditions and click a box 
that stated, “I have read and agree to the terms and conditions.”209 The terms and 
conditions indicated that she would receive emails, text messages, and phone 
calls over the next five days as part of the digital experience.210 It also contained 
a mandatory arbitration clause.211 Over the next few days, Duick received a series 
of emails of an “unsettling nature” from someone who seemed to know her and 
was preparing to visit her.212 The last email revealed that the series of emails was 
a prank that was part of Toyota’s advertising campaign for its Matrix vehicle.213 
Duick subsequently sued Toyota, claiming, among other things, intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.214 Toyota moved to compel arbitration pursuant to 
the terms and conditions Duick agreed to at the beginning of the study.215 
Duick contended that the arbitration provision was unenforceable because, 
even assuming that she clicked on the appropriate box, “the entire agreement is 
void because of fraud in the inception or execution.”216 The California appellate 
court agreed, noting that under California law, fraud in the execution meant that 
the promisor had no knowledge of what the promisor was doing: “[The promisor] 
actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a 
contract at all, mutual assent is lacking, and [the contract] is void. In such a case 
it may be disregarded without the necessity of rescission.”217 
The court distinguished fraud in the inducement, which occurs when the 
promisor “knows what he is signing but his consent is induced by fraud.”218 A 
contract that is the result of fraud in the inducement is not void, but voidable, and 
the party seeking to avoid it must rescind it.219 The court noted that fraud in the 
inception would render a contract “wholly void” when the victim acts “without 
negligence.”220 Thus, fraud in the inception requires not only that the victim was 
unaware of what he was signing, but also that it was reasonable for him to be 
unaware of what he was signing. 
                                                        
207  Id. 
208  Id. 
209  Id. 
210  Id. at 1319. 
211  Id. 
212  Id. 
213  Id. at 1320. 
214  Id. 
215  Id. 
216  Id. 
217  Id. 
218  Id. 
219  Id. 
220  Id. 
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The distinction between void and voidable becomes important when an in-
nocent third party becomes involved. Assume that A makes a fraudulent repre-
sentation, inducing B to sell her land to A. A then sells the land to C, a bona fide 
purchaser for value, who knows nothing of the fraud. B subsequently learns of 
the fraud and seeks to recover the property. B may only do so if the initial trans-
action is void (which it is not in this example).221 But why should B be held to 
the transaction if there was a failure of a consent condition (knowledge) due to 
false information supplied by A? As between A and B, B is not held to the trans-
action. But C is also innocent and would be harmed if the transaction were un-
done (remember C is a good faith purchaser for value). To allow B to undo the 
transaction between A and C threatens the security of transactions. The societal 
interest in the security of transactions in turn protects the interests of all individ-
uals in their property rights. Nobody would feel secure about their property rights 
if, at a later date, those rights could be taken away without their consent due to a 
claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Where the transaction is the result of fraud in the execution, the threat to the 
security of transactions is at greater risk if B is not allowed to nullify the trans-
action. A property owner might feel great uncertainty if he could lose his prop-
erty interest without even knowing it. B would not even know the nature of the 
transaction (and may not even be aware that there is any transaction at all) and 
so could have done nothing to prevent the fraud. C is in a better position to in-
vestigate the transaction than B, since C is at least aware that a transaction is 
taking place. 
By contrast, where the transaction is the result of fraud in the inducement, B 
has some knowledge, even if minimal, of the transaction. The knowledge condi-
tion may be deficient but it is not altogether absent. In this scenario, as between 
B and C (the subsequent good faith purchaser for value), B bears more responsi-
bility for the fraudulent transaction than C even if B is not responsible for the 
fraud itself. B is in a better position to guard against the fraudulent transaction 
and to discover the fraud before a subsequent transaction (such as the one be-
tween A and C) occurs. Furthermore, B is not without recourse because B may 
recover against A. Importantly, the chain of potential transactions does not end 
at C. C may subsequently transfer the property to another good faith purchaser 
for value, D (and so on). Consequently, the societal interest in the security of 
transactions is better served by finding an agreement resulting from fraud in the 
inducement to be voidable, rather than void. 
2. Duress 
Duress by physical compulsion renders an agreement void.222 One who is 
physically forced to sign a document is not acting autonomously but is a “mere 
                                                        
221  PERILLO, supra note 155, § 9.22, at 323–24. 
222  United States ex rel. Trane Co. v. Bond, 586 A.2d 734, 738 (Md. 1991) (summarizing 
several cases and noting that they “as well as the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
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mechanical instrument.”223 The consent conditions of voluntariness and the in-
tentional manifestation of consent are both absent. Consequently, any ostensible 
contract will be void and without legal effect even if innocent third parties are 
affected.224 
Jurisdictions are split on whether threats to inflict bodily injury render the 
contract void or voidable.225 Some jurisdictions and the Restatement find that 
duress sufficient to render a contract void requires physical force.226 Other juris-
dictions find that threats of immediate physical force that place the party in im-
minent fear of death, serious personal injury, or actual imprisonment render a 
contract void.227 In those cases, the condition of an intentional manifestation of 
consent is established but the act is not voluntary.228 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains the distinction between du-
ress by physical compulsion, which renders an ostensible contract void, and du-
ress by improper threat, which renders a contract voidable: 
In one, a person physically compels conduct that appears to be a manifestation of 
assent by a party who has no intention of engaging in that conduct. The result of 
this type of duress is that the conduct is not effective to create a contract. In the 
other, a person makes an improper threat that induces a party who has no reason-
able alternative to manifesting his assent. The result of this type of duress is that 
the contract that is created is voidable by the victim. This latter type of duress is 
in practice the more common and more important.229 
The type of duress is significant in cases involving surety contracts. In U.S. 
for Use of Trane Co. v. Bond, for example, the plaintiff sued the defendant to 
recover a payment bond that the defendant had signed as surety.230 The defendant 
asserted duress, claiming that her husband (also a surety) had “physically threat-
ened her and abused her to coerce her to sign a number of documents, including 
the payment bond” and did not explain to her the contents.231 She did not claim 
that her husband physically forced her hand to sign the document, nor did she 
                                                        
§§ 174, 175 (1981), distinguish between duress by physical compulsion, which may render a 
contract void, and duress by threat, which renders a contract voidable by the victim except 
where the other party to the contract in good faith, and without reason to know of the duress, 
either gives value or relies materially on the contract.”). 
223  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 cmt. a. (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
224  Id. § 174 cmt. b. 
225  Bond, 586 A.2d at 738. 
226  Id. 
227  Id. at 740 (noting that “duress sufficient to render a contract void consists of the actual 
application of physical force that is sufficient to, and does, cause the person unwillingly to 
execute the document; as well as the threat of application of immediate physical force suffi-
cient to place a person in the position of the signer in actual, reasonable, and imminent fear of 
death, serious personal injury, or actual imprisonment.”). 
228  Id. 
229  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 7, topic 2, intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
230  Bond, 586 A.2d at 735. 
231  Id. at 734–35. 
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claim that the plaintiff knew of the coercion.232 The court, in rejecting the “in-
flexible rule” of the Restatement, held that in Maryland, a contract may be void 
where “in addition to actual physical compulsion, a threat of imminent physical 
violence is exerted upon the victim of such magnitude as to cause a reasonable 
person, in the circumstances, to fear loss of life, or serious physical injury, or 
actual imprisonment for refusal to sign the document.”233 Thus, if the lower court 
found that the defendant was physically threatened, the contract would be void 
even against the plaintiff who was an innocent third party.234 
B. Defective Consent 
1. Undue Influence 
A contract is voidable by a party whose assent was induced by the undue 
influence of the other party.235 Undue influence is the unfair persuasion of one 
party by another where the victim is under the domination of the persuading 
party, or in a relationship with the persuading party that would lead the victim to 
justifiably assume that the persuading party is acting consistently with the vic-
tim’s welfare.236 Examples of these types of special relationships include par-
ent/child, attorney/client, and pastor/parishioner.237 Whether the persuasion is 
unfair depends upon a variety of factors, including the degree of the persuasion 
and relevant circumstances.238 Neither the existence of a special relationship nor 
the unfairness of the bargain alone suffices to establish undue influence; rather, 
it is the use of the special relationship to take advantage of the victim in a way 
that affected the victim’s judgment that makes the contract voidable.239 
The behavior of the persuading party is not threatening to the victim in the 
way required to prove duress, nor is the persuading party deceiving the victim as 
would be required to prove fraud or misrepresentation. Accordingly, the victim 
has neither been forced to enter into the contract nor mistaken about what the 
contract entailed. Rather, the rationale underlying undue influence is that the per-
                                                        
232  Id. 
233  Id. at 740. 
234  Id. 
235  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(2) (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
236  Id. § 177(1). 
237  Scribner v. Gibbs, 953 N.E.2d 475, 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that confidential 
relationships are a matter of trust and confidence and that “as a matter of law include relation-
ships such as attorney-at-law and client . . . pastor and parishioner, and parent and child.”). 
238  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. b (“The degree of persuasion that is 
unfair depends on a variety of circumstances. The ultimate question is whether the result was 
produced by means that seriously impaired the free and competent exercise of judgment. Such 
factors as the unfairness of the resulting bargain, the unavailability of independent advice, and 
the susceptibility of the person persuaded are circumstances to be taken into account in deter-
mining whether there was unfair persuasion, but they are not in themselves controlling.”). 
239  Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1575 (West 2017). 
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suading party manipulated the victim to act in a way that the victim later regret-
ted.240 Unlike defenses like fraud or mistake, the victim need not uncover any 
new information to show his consent was improperly obtained; instead, the vic-
tim shows that he was manipulated—and his judgment impaired—by someone 
he trusts.241 It is the exploitation of the relationship by the persuading party com-
bined with the vulnerability of the victim that results in a successful defense of 
undue influence. If someone who is not a party to the contract is the party exert-
ing the undue influence, the victim may still avoid the contract unless the other 
party to the contract acted in good faith and gave value for the transaction (or 
materially relied upon it).242 
In Kennedy v. Thomsen, the defendant, David Thomsen, had inherited 320 
acres of land from a great uncle.243 He leased most of the land to David Petersen, 
one of the defendants.244 Thomsen worked for Petersen as a farm laborer and a 
truck driver.245 There was evidence that Thomsen was “borderline mentally re-
tarded” and that he was “almost constantly drunk or drinking” when he was with 
Petersen.246 There was also evidence that suggested that Peterson “dominated” 
Thomsen.247 Peterson handled Thomsen’s business matters, which involved 
making various loans and other unexplained payments, and included arranging 
for Thomsen to obtain a loan with an interest rate “far in excess of that allowed 
at the time.”248 Thomsen agreed to sell Peterson 240 acres of his land for 
$255,000 but then agreed to substitute Peterson’s son-in-law and daughter, the 
Kennedys, for 160 of the acres.249 The Kennedys made a down payment of 
$50,000, much of which went to Peterson in the form of “fees.”250 When Thom-
sen subsequently refused to perform, the Kennedys brought an action for specific 
performance.251 Thomsen claimed that the sale was the product of undue influ-
ence, and sued to rescind the contract and to recover fees.252 The trial court held 
that Petersen and Thomsen were in a confidential relationship and that Petersen 
and the Kennedys tried to exploit that relationship.253 It also found that the terms 
of the transaction were “grossly unfair.”254 It set aside the deed to Petersen, and 
                                                        
240  Howe v. Palmer, 956 N.E.2d 249, 253–54 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (undue influence makes 
a victim act in a way “contrary to his true desire and free will.”). 
241  Rebidas v. Murasko, 677 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
242  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
243  Kennedy v. Thomsen, 320 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). 
244  Id. 
245  Id. 
246  Id. 
247  Id. 
248  Id. 
249  Id. 
250  Id. 
251  Id. 
252  Id. 
253  Id. at 659. 
254  Id. 
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entered a judgment for $43,764 against Petersen along with punitive damages of 
$5,000.255 It also dismissed the Kennedys’ action for specific performance, but 
granted the return of their $50,000 down payment.256 The Iowa Court of Appeals 
affirmed, noting that the factual circumstances of the transaction and the rela-
tionship between the parties established that the deed to Petersen and the contract 
with the Kennedys was the product of undue influence.257 It found that the con-
tract between the Kennedys and Thomsen could be set aside because the Kenne-
dys had reason to know of Petersen’s undue influence over Thomsen.258 Finally, 
the court stated that in order for Thomsen to defend against the Kennedy’s claim 
for specific performance, it was necessary for him to seek rescission, which re-
quired restoring the status quo and returning the down payment money.259 
2. Unconscionability 
The doctrine of unconscionability allows a court to refuse to enforce a con-
tract where the party seeking avoidance lacked meaningful choice and the terms 
of the contract are unreasonably one-sided.260 An unconscionable contract is one 
that “shock[s] the conscience.”261 As with undue influence, the party seeking en-
forcement is taking advantage of the other party; however, the vulnerability of 
the other party results from circumstances that preexisted the relationship be-
tween the parties. 
In the classic unconscionability case, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Company, the appellant Williams purchased several household items from the 
appellee furniture company on an installment plan.262 The installment plan con-
tract contained a provision that gave the company a security interest in every 
item purchased until the customer had paid off all the items.263 The court noted: 
Significantly, at the time of this and the preceding purchases, appellee was aware 
of appellant’s financial position. The reverse side of the stereo contract listed the 
name of appellant’s social worker and her $218 monthly stipend from the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, with full knowledge that appellant had to feed, clothe and 
support both herself and seven children on this amount, appellee sold her a $514 
stereo set. 
                                                        
255  Id. 
256  Id. 
257  Id. 
258  Id. 
259  Id. at 660. 
260  Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447–48 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (citing 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. 1964)). 
261  Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Baltazar v. 
Forever 21, Inc., 367 P.3d 6, 11 (Cal. 2016)). 
262  Williams, 350 F.2d at 447. 
263  Id. 
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We cannot condemn too strongly appellee’s conduct. It raises serious ques-
tions of sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings.264 
The defense of unconscionability is a way to show the deficiency of the vol-
untariness and knowledge conditions. The factors—unfair, one-sided terms and 
a lack of bargaining power—suggest that either the party did not know what the 
contract said (deficient knowledge condition) or had no alternatives (deficient 
voluntariness condition).265 If, as this Article argues, consent is a condition (or 
more precisely, a state which is the result of a set of conditions) rather than an 
on/off switch, it is not absent or destroyed in the case of unconscionability. It is, 
however, diminished or diluted compared to the consent of someone with plenty 
of choices who enters into a contract with eagerness and enthusiasm. Where a 
party seeks to escape performance on the grounds of unconscionability, there is 
no new information or situation that invalidates consent, only an inability or a 
disinclination to perform, which is justified if the other party’s behavior is ex-
ploitative or opportunistic.266 The voluntariness condition is diminished, but not 
to the extent required to prove duress. The knowledge condition is also dimin-
ished, but not as much as it would have to be to show fraud. It is the behavior of 
the party seeking to enforce the contract that tips the balance. Because of this, 
unconscionability is said to be a sliding scale, meaning that the knowledge and 
voluntariness conditions are determined by the egregiousness of the drafting 
party’s conduct.267 Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, for example, knew that 
Williams was in a precarious financial position when it sold her the furniture and 
yet made no effort to explain the unusual contractual provisions to her. 
3. Mistakes 
A mistake is “a belief that is not in accord with the facts.”268 In order to avoid 
a contract, the mistake must be a “basic assumption on which the contract was 
made” that has a “material effect on the agreed exchange of performances.”269 
The mistake must pertain to facts existing at the time the contract was made.270 
The party seeking avoidance must not “bear the risk of the mistake.”271 If both 
parties were operating under the mistake (called a mutual mistake), that is all that 
is required.272 If only one party was operating under the mistake (called a unilat-
eral mistake), that party also needs to show that: (1) enforcement of the contract 
                                                        
264  Id. at 448. The case was remanded for further proceedings since the lower courts did not 
issue findings on the possible unconscionability of the contracts. 
265  Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2013). 
266  Williams, 350 F.2d at 449. 
267  Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Ap-
proach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 12–19 (2012). 
268  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
269  Id. § 152(1). 
270  Id. 
271  Id. 
272  Id. 
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would be unconscionable or (2) the other party had “reason to know of the mis-
take or his fault caused the mistake.”273 
A party claiming she entered into a contract due to a mistake is essentially 
arguing that the knowledge condition is lacking but she was unaware of it at the 
time consent was manifested.274 The mistake doctrines essentially balance the 
autonomy interests of the parties. If both parties operated under the same mis-
take, there should be no injury if the contract is avoided because neither party 
agreed to the bargain as it turned out to be.275 Contract enforcement in such a 
situation would present one party with a windfall and force the other party to 
suffer a detriment for which she had not bargained.276 For example, X agrees to 
purchase Y’s building in order to open a restaurant. They both assume the build-
ing is suitable for this purpose. Subsequently, X discovers that there are hazard-
ous substances on the property that prevent her from operating a restaurant in the 
building. Both parties have obtained information that they previously lacked—
the building cannot be used by any establishment serving food. X would not have 
agreed to purchase the building if she had known about the hazardous substances. 
Y also did not know about the hazardous substances. If Y had known, he would 
not have been able to sell the building to anyone wishing to open a restaurant. It 
is likely that Y also would not have been able to sell the building at the price 
agreed upon with X and would have had to sell it at a much lower price. To 
enforce a contract based upon a mutual mistake would mean that one party ben-
efits to the other party’s detriment through no fault or virtue of either party. 
Where only one party is operating under the mistake, however, the non-mis-
taken party has consented to the bargain277 but the mistaken party has not.278 In 
order to find avoidance, the court must find a reason to favor the mistaken party’s 
interest over the non-mistaken party’s interest. If there is no such reason, then 
the combination of the non-mistaken party’s consent and X’s earlier consent tilt 
the balance in favor of enforcement. If, however, the non-mistaken party (Y) was 
at fault for the mistake, Y should not be permitted to benefit. Similarly, if Y knew 
of X’s mistake, then Y should not be permitted to take unfair advantage of it. 
Jurisdictions that follow the Restatement (Second) of Contracts permit rescission 
if enforcement would be unconscionable even if the mistake is not the fault of 
Y.279 The standard for unconscionability in the context of unilateral mistake ap-
pears to be lower than what is required where unconscionability is a standalone 
                                                        
273  Id. § 153. 
274  14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts § 126, at 350–51 (2016). 
275  Id. at 351–52. 
276  For a discussion of the role of windfalls in mistake and frustration cases, see Andrew Kull, 
Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1 
(1991). 
277  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157. 
278  See id. 
279  Id. § 153. 
18 NEV. L.J. 165, KIM - FINAL 12/15/17  12:41 PM 
208 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:165  
defense.280 Rather than a result that would “shock the conscience,” courts assess 
whether the result of the mistake significantly harms the mistaken party and 
whether any injury to the non-mistaken party may be restored. 
With both unilateral and mutual mistakes, courts are balancing the interests 
of the parties and the societal interest in the security of transactions. There are 
two important factors in judicial application of these rules: the passage of time 
and the transfer of possession.281 The more time that elapses from contract for-
mation to notification of the mistake, the less likely courts have been to allow 
rescission for mistake.282 Conversely, the less time that elapses from formation 
to notification of mistake, the more likely courts are to allow rescission.283 The 
passage of time increases the risk that the non-mistaken party will rely upon the 
contract.284 If the non-mistaken party relied upon the contract, the court is less 
likely to find unconscionability.285 Even if the non-mistaken party has not relied 
upon the contract in a concrete way or can be reimbursed for reliance costs, 
courts seem to consider whether it would be fair to defeat the party’s expectation 
interest.286 While the expectancy interest is often discussed in terms of monetary 
value, there is also an emotional aspect to expectation. Although the parties have 
a contractual expectation interest at the time of contract formation, the emotional 
expectation interest develops over time as the time for performance draws near. 
The party has a growing emotional stake in the contract’s performance, which 
may not be satisfied with reliance damages. A person who has been anticipating 
and contemplating a contract’s performance for weeks has a greater expectation 
than one who is told immediately after formation that the other party was oper-
ating under a mistake. Dashing the expectation of one who has been thinking 
about the contract for weeks or months is a more serious matter than rescinding 
the contract seconds after acceptance. Similarly, obtaining physical possession 
creates a sense of ownership and further entrenches the emotional stake in the 
object which is the subject of the transaction. It also increases the risk that the 
object may be subsequently transferred to another, which makes allowing avoid-
ance after transfer of possession a greater risk to the societal interest in the secu-
rity of transactions. 
                                                        
280  Unconscionability is discussed in Section III.B.2. The discussion on mistakes and changed 
circumstances elaborates upon the author’s earlier work, Nancy Kim, Mistakes, Changed Cir-
cumstances and Intent, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 510 (2008). 
281  Kim, supra note 48, at 488–89. 
282  See id. at 486–500 (showing a variety of case law where this principle is demonstrated). 
283  See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 (AM. 
L. INST. 2011). 
284  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1981) (noting that in 
cases of unilateral mistake, “(r)eliance by the other party may make enforcement of a contract 
proper although enforcement would otherwise be unconscionable. . . . If . . . the other party 
has relied on the contract in some substantial way, avoidance may leave that reliance uncom-
pensated.”). 
285  Id. 
286  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 68 (AM. L. INST. 1937). 
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In Donovan v. RRL Corp., the California Supreme Court permitted rescis-
sion on the grounds of unilateral mistake in favor of a defendant automobile 
dealer who had made a typographical error.287 The error resulted in the advertis-
ing for sale of a used Jaguar at a price that was approximately $12,000 less than 
what the dealership intended.288 Donovan visited the dealership after seeing the 
advertisement for the Jaguar.289 He took it for a test drive and then told the sales-
person, “Okay. We will take it at your price, $26,000.”290 When the salesperson 
didn’t respond, he showed him the advertisement.291 The salesperson immedi-
ately informed him that the price was incorrect.292 Donovan asked to speak to the 
sales manager, and the manager apologized and offered to pay for Donovan’s 
fuel, time, and effort expended in traveling to the dealership.293 When Donovan 
refused, the manager then offered to sell him the Jaguar for $37,016, which was 
approximately $900 less than the intended sales price.294 Donovan refused and 
sued.295 The California Supreme Court, reversing the appellate court’s judgment, 
held that the dealership had made a unilateral mistake in advertising the sale price 
of the Jaguar.296 After walking through the different requirements needed to 
prove unilateral mistake, the Court stated that to enforce the contract against the 
dealership would be unconscionable because the mistake was an error amounting 
to 32 percent of the intended price.297 But the percentage obscures the actual 
numbers: the dealership had paid $35,000 for the Jaguar, so the dealership’s ac-
tual loss if the contract were enforced at the unintended price would have been 
about $9,000.298 It hardly seems to “shock the conscience” to enforce a validly 
formed contract that would have resulted in a loss of $9,000 to a luxury car deal-
ership.299 
Unconscionability, in the context of unilateral mistake, means that it would 
be unfair to enforce the contract because the mistaken party would not have en-
tered into it if it had known the true facts.300 Given the lack of consent at the time 
of performance, the interests of the other party must justify enforcement.301 In 
Donovan, the dealership never intended to sell the vehicle at the advertised price. 
It did not know that the advertised price was $12,000 lower than the intended 
                                                        
287  Donovan v. RRL Corp., 27 P.3d 702, 708, 725 (Cal. 2001). 
288  Id. at 717. 
289  Id. at 707. 
290  Id. 
291  Id. 
292  Id. 
293  Id. 
294  Id. 
295  Id. 
296  Id. at 708–09, 725. 
297  Id. at 717. 
298  Id. at 724. 
299  See id. at 723. 
300  Id. at 714. 
301  Id. 
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price.302 Donovan was notified of the error immediately after acceptance and he 
did not obtain possession of the vehicle, so his emotional expectation interest 
was minimal and there was no risk to a subsequent transferee.303 Furthermore, 
the dealership offered to pay for his transportation costs, demonstrating its good 
faith and limiting any harm caused to Donovan.304 
C. Extinguished Consent 
1. Changed Circumstances 
Like mistakes, the changed circumstances doctrines—frustration of purpose, 
impracticability, and impossibility—allow a party to escape performance if there 
is a basic assumption error.305 In these cases, however, the basic assumption error 
concerns a supervening event306 that arises after the contract was formed.307 The 
non-occurrence of the supervening event was an implied condition to the con-
tract. The supervening event could also involve the non-occurrence of a condi-
tion that the parties had assumed would occur.308 
In Taylor v. Caldwell, generally recognized as the first case involving the 
defense of impossibility, the court established the rule that if the existence of a 
particular thing is necessary for a party’s performance, and the thing is destroyed, 
the party’s performance under the contract is excused.309 Taylor agreed to pay 
Caldwell £100 per day for four days for the use of Caldwell’s music hall.310 Less 
than a week before the first day, the music hall was accidentally destroyed by 
fire.311 Taylor, who had incurred costs in preparation of the performances that 
were to take place at the music hall, sued Caldwell for breach of contract.312 The 
                                                        
302  Id. at 707. 
303  Id. at 724. 
304  Id. 
305  See generally Kim, supra note 48, at 506. 
306  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 271 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
307  Id. § 261 (“Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable 
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic as-
sumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, 
unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”). 
308  See id. § 271 (“Impracticability excuses the non-occurrence of a condition if the occurrence 
of the condition is not a material part of the agreed exchange and forfeiture would otherwise 
result.”). 
309  Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 309 (K.B. 1863). 
310  Id. at 310. 
311  Id. at 311. 
312  Id. at 310. 
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court found that the continued existence of the music hall was an implied condi-
tion of the contract.313 Because the fire destroyed the music hall, Caldwell’s per-
formance was excused.314 The parties had not expressly discussed or even con-
sciously considered the continued existence of the music hall, but they had tacitly 
assumed its existence. Their tacit assumption was incorrect, meaning that their 
knowledge about the transaction was incorrect. While they may have consented 
to the transaction at one time, they did so with incomplete or inadequate infor-
mation. The lack of information was material—neither party would have agreed 
to the transaction if they had known that the supervening event would occur (that 
a fire would destroy the music hall). Both parties assumed that at the time of the 
performance, the music hall would be in substantially the same condition as it 
was at the time of contract formation. Caldwell would not have agreed to a con-
tract that required him to deliver possession of a non-existent structure, or one 
that needed to be entirely rebuilt. Taylor would not have agreed to rent out the 
music hall if he knew that the premises would be charred ruins. The continued 
existence of the music hall (the assumption that it would not be burned down) 
was an implied condition of their agreement. 
Imagine that Caldwell had been willing to deliver the premises in their ru-
ined state and insisted that Taylor continue to perform. Taylor presumably would 
have sought to escape enforcement for the same reason that Caldwell did in the 
actual case—because an implied condition to the contract was destroyed, thus 
destroying his consent. While it was impossible for Caldwell to deliver the prem-
ises in the condition both parties expected, it would not have been impossible for 
Taylor to pay the money that he was expected to pay. The applicable defense for 
someone in Taylor’s position would be frustration of purpose. The doctrine of 
frustration of purpose has been referred to as the “companion rule”315 of the doc-
trine of impossibility. Under the doctrine of frustration of purpose, performance 
remains possible but the expected value of the performance to the party seeking 
to be excused has been destroyed by the supervening event. The event forces the 
parties to recognize a failure on their part to expressly address a condition to 
performance. This failure is excusable because it would be undesirable (as well 
as impossible) to address every single implied condition or contingency to per-
formance. The parties would have to include every possible event that would 
affect or impede their performance regardless of how likely it would be to occur. 
The third changed circumstances doctrine, impracticability, applies where 
performance is technically possible but would impose a much greater than ex-
pected cost upon one party.316 When the issue arises, at least one of the parties 
has already incurred costs in performance. The question is  who should bear the 
costs. 
                                                        
313  Id. at 314. 
314  Id. at 315. 
315  Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., 566 N.E.2d 603, 605 (Mass. 1991). 
316   Kim, supra note 48, at 507. 
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With all three changed circumstances doctrines, the central issue concerns 
the allocation of risk of the supervening event. In some cases (such as war or 
riot), neither party could have foreseen, insured against, or prevented the risk.317 
The Uniform Commercial Code318 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts319 
state that performance may be excused if it was premised upon a basic assump-
tion that turns out to be false. In other words, the party seeking avoidance is 
arguing that the supervening circumstance altered the bargain so substantially 
that she would not have consented to the contract if she had known it would 
occur. Like other basic assumption defenses, impracticability is a failure of the 
knowledge condition (and so a failure of consent). Thus, the court must deter-
mine whether the avoiding party was aware of the possibility of the occurrence 
but discounted its likelihood. This is not the same thing as having failed to con-
sider it at all. The UCC distinguishes between lacking information (which results 
in a failure of consent and excuses performance) and making an inaccurate deci-
sion based upon the information (which results only in a lost gamble and does 
not excuse performance).320 In order for these defenses to apply, the circumstance 
must not have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time of con-
tracting.321 Increased costs and a rise or collapse in the market by themselves do 
not justify excusing performance because these are presumably foreseeable in all 
business contracts.322 Performance is excused only when the change is due to an 
“unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance.”323 
A party may also be found to have assumed greater liability in the express terms 
of the agreement, the circumstances surrounding the contract, trade usage, and 
other relevant evidence pertaining to the parties’ intent.324 The requirement of 
unforeseeability is a way to assess the knowledge condition. An event that is 
foreseeable means that the parties had some information that the contingency 
                                                        
317  Richard Posner and Andrew Rosenfield argued that the party in the better position to fore-
see, insure or prevent the risk should bear the risk. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. 
Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 83, 83 (1977). 
318  U.C.C. § 2-615 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“Except so far as a seller may 
have assumed a greater obligation . . . (a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part 
by a seller . . . is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has 
been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was 
a basic assumption on which the contract was made. . . .”). Although the section refers ex-
pressly to sellers, courts have interpreted it to include buyers as well. See Lawrance v. Elmore 
Bean Warehouse, Inc., 702 P.2d 930, 932 (Idaho 1985). 
319  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
320  See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1786 n.269 (1997). 
321  UCC § 2-615 cmt. 1. 
322  Id. cmt. 4. 
323  Id. 
324  See id. cmt. 8. 
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might occur; an unforeseeable contingency means that the parties had no such 
information.325 
2. The Effect of a Basic Assumption on the Knowledge Condition 
Basic assumption defenses involve a failure or deficit of the knowledge con-
dition, similar to a misunderstanding between the parties. They involve errors 
caused by a lack of knowledge—in the case of changed circumstances, about the 
future, in the case of mistakes, about the state of the world, and in the case of 
misunderstandings, about what the other party is thinking. Whether to allow 
avoidance depends upon countervailing interests. The lack of consent of the party 
seeking avoidance should be weighed against the interest of the other party, who 
may have taken steps in anticipation of the contemplated agreement. 
Consent destruction, like consent construction, is a sliding scale. Intent im-
pacts the knowledge condition, which is essential to consent.326 Determining the 
intent of the parties is necessary in order to determine to what the parties con-
sented.327 Importantly, courts should consider the intent of both parties, not just 
the intent of the party seeking to escape the contract. Consent (or the absence 
thereof) at the time of performance is an important consideration, but it is not 
determinative in light of consent at the time of contract formation. The reality is 
that in most cases, neither party would have consented to the transaction if they 
had known of the supervening event. While Caldwell may not have consented to 
the contract if he had known the music hall was going to be destroyed, Taylor 
would not have incurred costs in preparing for the music performances. Assum-
ing that neither party was responsible for the fire, why should Taylor bear the 
preparation costs instead of Caldwell? Given the nature of the supervening 
event—the destruction of Caldwell’s property—it seems fair to allocate the bur-
den to Taylor. Taylor is blameless but so is Caldwell. His loss likely far exceeds 
Taylor’s loss. It would be adding insult to injury to make Caldwell responsible 
for Taylor’s loss in addition to his own. 
Certainly, the result would be different in modern times. Even if the parties 
did not consciously contemplate a fire, they probably would have used a standard 
contract that contained terms addressing the possibility of a fire. Furthermore, 
Caldwell would likely have an obligation (statutory, contractual, or customary) 
to insure the premises from fire damage. If Caldwell were insured, it would be 
fairer to allocate the loss to Caldwell and his insurance company. If Caldwell 
failed to obtain insurance, he would be found at fault and would bear the loss in 
that case, too. 
                                                        
325  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 351 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
326  See id. § 24. 
327  See id. § 21. 
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D. Enforceability and Illegal Contracts 
The common belief and the traditional view is that an illegal contract is void 
or unenforceable and that a court will leave the parties to an illegal contract where 
it finds them.328 The reality is more complicated.329 Courts may consider the rel-
ative culpability of the parties, and allow recovery by the less culpable party.330 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts avoids using the term “illegal bargain” 
and refers to bargains that are unenforceable on grounds of public policy.331 The 
void/voidable confusion persists with illegal contracts. Generally, a contract 
whose object or purpose is illegal is void.332 Where the illegality is only collateral 
to the contract whose purpose is not illegal or against public policy, the contract 
may be voidable but not void.333 Even this general statement is subject to excep-
tions and caveats. 
The “illegal contracts” category often leads to confusion because it is impre-
cise and too broad, capturing contracts that have different legal effects.334 It in-
cludes agreements that are void, voidable, or unenforceable as against public 
policy. The nature of the illegality spans a wide spectrum, from felonies to im-
proper licenses. 
In assessing the enforceability of an illegal contract, the courts generally 
consider three important factors: the culpability of the parties, the policy under-
lying the relevant law, and the risk of forfeiture.335 If there is a risk of forfeiture,  
courts are more inclined to enforce the contract, provided that doing so does not 
undermine the reason for the law or harm public welfare.336 The greater the risk 
                                                        
328  See, e.g., Trees v. Kersey, 56 P.3d 765, 771 (Idaho 2002) (“When a court invokes the 
illegality doctrine, it denies enforcement of the contract, leaving the parties where it finds 
them.”). 
329  See 6 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12.4 (Richard A. 
Long ed., 4th ed. 1995) (“It is commonly said that illegal bargains are void. This statement, 
however, is not entirely correct.”). 
330  See Trees, 56 P.3d at 771 (“Courts on occasion . . . apply an exception to the illegality 
doctrine where both parties concur in the illegal act, but the parties are not equally at fault by 
reason of that fact that one party commits fraud, or there is duress, oppression, or undue influ-
ence over the other. In such a situation the courts have allowed the less guilty party to re-
cover.”) (citations omitted). 
331  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. L. INST. 1981). In making that assess-
ment, the Restatement Second includes factors such as the parties’ justified expectations, for-
feiture resulting from nonenforcement, public interests, the misconduct of the parties, and the 
effect on relevant policy. Id. 
332  Id. § 203 cmt. c. 
333  Nagel v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 217 F.3d 436, 439–40 (7th Cir. 2000). 
334  See Chunlin Leonhard, Illegal Agreements and the Lesser Evil Principle, 64 CATHOLIC 
U.L. REV. 833, 834–35 (2015) (discussing illegal agreements and advocating for explicit adop-
tion of the lesser evil principle to resolve disputes involving illegal agreements). 
335  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178. 
336  Geis v. Colina Del Rio, L.P., 362 S.W.3d 100, 106 (Tex. App. 2011) (“The defense of in 
pari delicto requires Texas Courts, as a general rule, to decline to enforce illegal contracts 
when the contracting parties are equally blameworthy.”). 
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of forfeiture and the better the moral standing of the party seeking enforcement, 
the more likely a court is to find the contract enforceable.337  
In U.S. Nursing Corp. v. Saint Joseph Medical Center, a nurse staffing 
agency, U.S. Nursing, entered into a contract with a hospital, St. Joseph.338 Under 
the contract, either party could terminate the agreement upon seven days no-
tice.339 If the hospital terminated the contract without giving notice, it was re-
quired to pay U.S. Nursing the equivalent of what it would have been paid for 
the seven-day period.340 At the time of contracting, U.S. Nursing had not yet ap-
plied for a license to conduct a nursing agency in Illinois.341 Its application was 
subsequently rejected by the Illinois Department of Labor in part because it had 
failed to demonstrate financial solvency and failed to properly train and vet its 
nurses.342 The Department of Labor also contacted St. Joseph’s and told them to 
immediately stop using the services of U.S. Nursing.343 St. Joseph immediately 
terminated the contract and paid U.S. Nursing for all services rendered up to the 
cancellation date, but it did not pay for the additional seven days as provided in 
the agreement.344 U.S. Nursing sued St. Joseph’s for breach of contract.345 The 
district court found the contract unenforceable and the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed.346 
The court stated that contracts for the performance of an illegal act were 
“void and unenforceable.”347 It then noted that some contracts based on a “legit-
imate subject matter” that are performed in an “unlawful manner” could be un-
enforceable in certain circumstances.348 It noted, however, that if the statutory 
violation did not seriously undermine public policy or the public welfare, then 
the contract would be enforced.349 The Seventh Circuit noted that St. Joseph had 
paid U.S. Nursing for all services rendered and that what U.S. Nursing was seek-
ing was recovery of “what amounts to a penalty provision for termination of the 
contract without sufficient notice.”350 The Court stated that the public policy be-
hind the licensing requirement was to protect the public health and that the public 
policy underlying the Act “clearly outweighs the interest in enforcement of this 
contract.”351 
                                                        
337  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227. 
338  U.S. Nursing Corp. v. Saint Joseph Med. Ctr., 39 F.3d 790, 791 (7th Cir. 1994). 
339  Id. 
340  Id. 
341  Id. 
342  Id. at 792. 
343  Id. 
344  Id. 
345  Id. 
346  Id. at 792, 795. 
347  Id. at 792. 
348  Id. at 792. 
349  Id. 
350  Id. at 795. 
351  Id. 
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E. Blameworthiness and Forfeiture 
A relevant consideration in determining whether a contract is void or voida-
ble is the policy against forfeitures.352 The standard remedy for a party seeking 
to avoid a contract is rescission.353 A party seeking to rescind a contract must 
make restitution.354 A voidable contract allows the parties to return to status 
quo.355 A void contract, on the other hand, means there is no contract. An equi-
table remedy, however, may be available even if a legal remedy is not.356 Resti-
tution may be granted in situations where there is no contract and so nothing to 
rescind. For example, with an illegal contract, if the party negatively affected by 
the forfeiture is also the wrongdoer, the courts will consider the relative culpa-
bility of the parties and may grant restitution without recognizing a contract.357 
In such cases, courts assess whether the harm to the underlying law (which makes 
the contract illegal) outweighs the harm of forfeiture.358 In addition, courts con-
sider the effect of designating a contract as void or voidable on innocent third 
parties. 
For example, in Bankers Trust Company v. Litton Systems, Inc.,359 Angelo 
Buquicchio, a salesman for Royal, recommended that Litton (a company affili-
ated with Royal) lease photocopiers from Regent.360 Regent was to purchase the 
equipment from Royal and then lease it to Litton.361 Unknown to Litton, Regent 
allegedly bribed Buquicchio so that he would make the recommendation.362 In 
order to finance the purchase of the photocopies from Royal, Regent borrowed 
money from plaintiff Bankers Trust and Chemical.363 Bankers Trust and Chemi-
cal had no knowledge of the payments Regent made to Buquicchio.364 As security 
for the transaction, Regent assigned the Litton leases to Bankers Trust and Chem-
ical.365 The lease permitted assignment, and provided that the assignee’s trust 
would be independent of any claims that Litton might have against Regent.366 
Litton defaulted under the leases, and Bankers Trust and Chemical sued for 
amounts due.367 Litton argued that the alleged bribery payments to Buquicchio 
                                                        
352  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
353  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 54 cmt. c (AM. L. 
INST. 2011). 
354  Id. § 54. 
355  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7. 
356  Mickelson v. Barnet, 460 N.E.2d 566, 569 (Mass. 1984). 
357  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31. 
358  Johnson v. Johnson, 192 Cal. App. 3d 551, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
359  See generally Bankers Trust Co. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 599 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1979). 
360  Id. at 490. 
361  Id. 
362  Id. 
363  Id. 
364  Id. 
365  Id. 
366  Id. 
367  Id. 
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rendered the leases between Regent and Litton void so as to make the obligations 
under them void even for bona fide holders in due course who had no knowledge 
of the illegal conduct.368 The lower court found that, although the making of pay-
ments to Buquicchio “could constitute a defense as against Regent . . . [it] could 
not be asserted against a holder in due course” like Bankers Trust and Chemi-
cal.369 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court.370 
The court framed the issue as “whether a holder in due course may enforce 
lease contracts not enforceable by the holder’s assignor because the contracts 
were induced by commercial bribery committed by the assignor.”371 It noted that 
there was an important distinction between the lease contracts for the photocop-
iers, which were “not themselves illegal,” and the contract to bribe a person in 
connection with those lease contracts, which was illegal.372 Although the contract 
at issue was not itself illegal, it presumably would have been unenforceable in a 
lawsuit brought by the wrongdoer (here, Regent) since there would have been a 
“direct connection” between the bribe and the basis for the lawsuit.373 
The court stated that the illegality defense under New York law374 against a 
holder in due course is available only if “the effect of the illegality is to make the 
obligation entirely null and void.”375 It is not available if the illegality is merely 
voidable.376 The court stated that cases addressing the enforceability of “bribery-
induced” contracts suggested that such contracts were “void,” but that a closer 
analysis of the cases indicated that this was just the result of imprecise lan-
guage.377 The court cited to a comment in the Restatement of Contracts that “no 
one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud.”378 It added, however, that the 
policy did not apply where innocent third parties were involved: 
Where an innocent third party, such as a holder in due course, is suing upon an 
illegal contract, the policy argument is inapplicable because the plaintiff has done 
no wrong for which it should be penalized. Moreover, insofar as it is enforcing 
the rights of an innocent party, the court does not blacken its name or participate 
in a wrong when it enforces an illegal contract.379 
                                                        
368  Id. at 491. 
369  Id. 
370  Id. at 494. 
371  Id. at 491. 
372  Id. 
373  Id. 
374  Id. (citing N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(b)). 
375  Id. 
376  Id. at 491–92. 
377  Id. at 492 (“Since the New York cases on illegal contracts induced by commercial bribery 
do not involve holders in due course, one could reasonably assume that the authors of those 
opinions were using the term ‘void’ loosely, without regard to its importance when a holder 
in due course enters the picture.”). 
378  Id. 
379  Id. at 492–93 (footnote omitted).
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The court further noted that the holder in due course doctrine “embodies 
important policies,” namely those that facilitate commercial transactions, which 
must be balanced against the policy to prevent bribery-induced contracts.380 
As the Litton case illustrates, the determination that a contract is void has the 
potential to harm innocent third parties.381 For this reason, courts may find a con-
tract to be voidable even where a statute expressly uses the term “void.”382 In 
addition, even where the court finds the agreement to be void, it may still grant 
restitution of benefits conferred if necessary to avoid a forfeiture.383 
The law regarding illegality may be understood through the lens of consent. 
If the act itself is illegal, the party has no power to consent to it. If the underlying 
act is a crime, the reason for its illegality is that it harms third parties, and causing 
this harm is not something which the parties have the power to do. For example, 
an agreement to steal property and split the profits is not something to which the 
parties may consent. Although they may reallocate their property rights, they 
lack the authority to decide what happens to property which is not theirs. If, how-
ever, the underlying act is not criminal (meaning that the parties have the right 
to reallocate the property rights which are the subject of the contract) then the 
courts assess the conditions of consent, including the relative blameworthiness 
of the parties, in determining the effect of the illegality. For example, in U.S. 
Nursing Corp. v. Saint Joseph Medical Center, Saint Joseph Medical Center was 
ordered by the Labor Department to terminate the services of U.S. Nursing Corp. 
due to the latter’s inability to meet regulatory requirements.384 Saint Joseph Med-
ical Center paid for the services which it received; it only refused to pay the fees 
due under the termination provision.385 In other words, Saint Joseph Medical 
Center paid for what it consented to and should not be made to pay for something 
which it probably would not have consented to if it had full information regard-
ing U.S. Nursing Corp.’s status. Thus, the case can be viewed as one involving 
omitted terms (i.e. a deficiency in the knowledge condition). Saint Joseph had 
assumed that the seven-day termination provision would only apply in situations 
                                                        
380  Id. at 494 (stating that “the holder in due course is protected not because of his praiseworthy 
character, but to the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in without elaborate 
investigation of the process leading up to the contract or instrument and in reliance on the 
contract rights of one who offers them for sale or to secure a loan.”). 
381  Id. at 492. 
382  New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. C’Est Moi, Inc., 519 F.3d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 
WILLISTON, supra note 329, at 38–41 (“Statutes may and sometimes do make bargains abso-
lutely void, but even though a statute states in its terms that a particular bargain is ‘void,’ this 
has often been held to mean ‘voidable.’ ”). 
383  See Veridyne Corp. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 575, 586 (2008) (“Forfeiture is an inap-
propriate remedy for common-law fraud except when a conflict of interest is perpetuated . . . 
or where an agent of a contractor obtains a contract through a conflict of interest. The case 
law, properly read, does not support defendant’s argument that the appropriate remedy for any 
contract that is void ab initio is forfeiture of monies already paid or the denial of recovery in 
quantum meruit or quantum valebat.”). 
384  See discussion supra Section III.D. 
385  See discussion supra Section III.D. 
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where it had decided to terminate without cause and at its discretion. It had not 
envisioned a situation where it was ordered to terminate due to something which 
was entirely the fault of U.S. Nursing Corp. As between the two parties, U.S. 
Nursing Corp. is more blameworthy than Saint Joseph Medical Center for the 
termination of services and so Saint Joseph Medical Center’s “interpretation” of 
the provision should prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
In the past forty years, there has been a rise in scholarship arguing that the 
underlying objective of contract law is the furtherance of economic efficiency 
and the facilitation of economic growth. But the moral justification for contract 
has always been consent. Because the meaning of consent has been obscured, it 
has too often been conflated and confused with an intentional act or “manifesta-
tion,” which was assumed to indicate consent. The validity of consent, however, 
depends upon the validity of the conditions which are constitutive of it. It is the 
process of evaluating the conditions of consent which I have sought to render 
more transparent in this Article. 
A relative consent framework captures more than the subjective state of the 
consenting party; it breaks down the conditions which constitute consent and as-
sesses them in light of the conduct of both parties in order to determine the “va-
lidity” of consent. This approach is both an affirmation and an elaboration of 
Melvin Eisenberg’s basic contracts principle. Eisenberg’s basic contracts princi-
ple “recognizes that contract is a process [and] that the picture we see at the time 
of contract formation . . . is only one of a series of frames. Unless contract law 
responds to the whole moving picture, it cannot capture the reality of contract.”386 
Consent, too, is part of a moving picture, not simply an act manifested at a given 
point in time. Like contracts, the reality of consent can only be captured as a 














                                                        
386  Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1813–14. 
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